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Political Markets and Community Self-Determination:
Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacyt
Frank I. Michelman*
Some recent studies have sought to "define and illuminate the basic
character of the legal system"' by exposing a more-or-less hidden "implicit
economic logic"2 in the system, suggesting that "the . . . system itself-its
doctrines, procedures, and institutions-has been strongly influenced by a
concern (more often implicit than explicit) with promoting economic efficien-
cy. "S The studies have concentrated on legal activity of a sort that seemingly
would be most resistant to unifying rationalization in strongly goal-orientated
terms-that is, to common-law adjudication in the well-trodden ways of
private law, where law is supposedly made incrementally and under severe
formalistic constraint (if "made" at all and not just "found") and openly in-
strumentalist reasoning is not usually professed without at least a hint of
apology or recrimination. They have made rather impressive progress in an
effort to show that the ostensibly divergent and disrelated materials of the
common law can be unified, ordered, made mutually coherent, by regarding
them as the handiwork of generations of judges motivated by an aim-veiled
tThis article is a significantly revised version of the Harris Lectures delivered in April,
1977 at the Indiana University School of Law of Bloomington. It has had the benefit of valuable
criticism from several colleagues and friends who kindly read earlier drafts or portions, including
Bruce Ackerman, Philip Heymann, Duncan Kennedy, Mitchell Polinsky, Richard Posner,
members of the Society for Ethical and Legal Philosophy, and members of the Law and
Economics Workshop at the University of California at Los Angeles.
*B.A. 1957 Yale; LL.B 1960. Professor of Law, Harvard.
'Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 757, 764 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Posner I].
2Id. at 760. See also R. POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
'Posner I, supra note 1, at 763-64.
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and inarticulate but nonetheless conscious-of making the law efficient in a
strictly economic sense.4 Common law doctrines and decisions are thus viewed
as the outward manifestations of an underlying normative order.
As a student of public law-local government law particularly-I am led
to wonder whether an identical or parallel regularity can be discovered in the
characteristic materials of that field. Of course, the field of local government
law cannot offer for investigation anything quite corresponding to the com-
mon law-the unwritten, judge-created law-insofar as legal theory insists
that all claims of local-government authority must be traceable to specific,
formal constitutional or statutory sources.5 Yet a great deal of the law to
which courts appeal as delineating local-government authority is actually so
open, so little constrained or determined by constitutional or statutory texts,
so little referable to any discoverable legislative intent-is rather so much and
so obviously a product of doctrinal formulations evolved by judges in the
course of case-by-case adjudication, from sources and inspirations quite
beyond written texts or suppositious historical intentions-that whole masses
can fairly be said to compose a floating "general law" of local government
hardly less open to spontaneous judicial economizing, or less inviting to the
rationalizing ambitions of a theorist, than is the corpus of private-law doc-
trine . 6
This general law encompasses not only judicial elaborations of vague con-
stitutional phrases but also judge-made doctrines of implied constitutional
limitations and so-called "canons of contruction" for statutory material. To
give just a few illustrations: The universally recognized judicial doctrines that
restrict exercises of regulatory authority to those that promote "the general
welfare," or demand that tax revenues be expended only for a "public pur-
pose," may be thought implicit in the standard constitutional injunction
against depriving persons of property and liberty without due process of law,
or in constitutional grants to legislatures to exercise the power to tax, or they
may just be direct judicial implications of constitutional intent claiming no
4See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2, pt. II; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972); Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. &
EcON. 201 (1971). There are other contributors and contributions of merit, a good collection of
which can be gleaned from EcONOMIC AANALYSIS, supra note 2, passim. For Professor Posner's
view that the efficiency-tending characteristic he finds in the common law is, at least in part, a
result of conscious judicial striving towards efficiency, see EcONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at
181, 405; see also id. at 440-41. For a contrasting view see Rubin, Why is the Common Law Effi-
dent?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (1977); Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effi-
cient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). For further discussion see notes 221-227 infta & text ac-
companying.
'See, e.g., J. DILLON. 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55
(5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as J. DILLON].
6"[A]n historical view shows due process as an example of the method of the common law,
both because it has evolved slowly and because its development has been so thoroughly in the
hands of the judiciary." Miller, The Forest of Due Process Law: The American Constitutional
Tradition, in NOMOS XVIII: DuE PRocESs at 4 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).
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specific textual base.7 Rarely does anything seem to turn on which theory is
used. Again, the standard constitutional recitals that something called "the
legislative power" is "vested in" the state legislature8 may be a partial source
of the judicial doctrine that limits the extent to which state legislatures may
"delegate" authority to local units of government or to nonpublic agencies. 9
The due process clauses may also be a source of such doctrine. 10 Likewise,
state statutes conferring specified powers or functions on local governments
may provide a basis for judicial holdings that restrict the extent to which the
designated local governments may, in turn, delegate those powers or func-
tions to other public or nonpublic agencies - as may, again, the due process
clauses. 12 But little seems to turn on identifying textual bases for delegation
doctrine. There exists a general body of law on delegation which has a life of
its own not significantly determined by constitutional verbiage, which speaks
through non-enacted doctrinal formulations and gives rise to non-enacted
rules for construing statutes, such as the famous "Dillon Rule" of strict con-
struction of legislative grants of governmental power to local units.13
Inasmuch as these "open" areas of public law pertain to disputes about
the extent of governmental powers or the procedures for exercising them, it is
natural to think that a judge formulating doctrine or deciding cases in these
areas would have somewhere in mind a normative model of government,
however indistinct, inarticulate, or intuitive the model might be- a normative
model being a general conception of how governmental institutions ideally
must be supposed to work in order to satisfy the conditions of a theory of
moral justification for such institutions. Governmental institutions tend to oc-
cupy morally problematic positions-generate a continuing demand for moral
justification because our world is one in which ultimate ends are generally
taken to be those of individuals and social arrangements, accordingly, tend to
7The two ideas-the ultra vires idea that the constitutional grant of authority to levy taxes
does not encompass levies whose proceeds are directed to nonpublic purposes, and the individual-
rights idea that there is a constitutionally protected personal or individual right not to have one's
property appropriated for nonpublic purposes-are commingled in the classic case of Loan Ass'n
v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875). See also Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454
(1873); T. COOLEY, 2 CONSTITrIONAL LIMITATIONS 1026-40 (1927). For the view that constitu-
tional due process guaranties incorporate this personal right, see, e.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896); Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799
(1938).
aE.g., TENN. CoNsT. art. 2, § 3 (1956); MASS. CONST. C. 1, § 1, art. IV; id. DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS art. XXX.
'E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 328 Mass. 674, 105 N.E.2d 565 (1952).
0E.g., Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479 (1847) (natural rights) (semble); Eubank v.
Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1921) (due process). See notes 63-103, 110-18, 130-42 infra & text ac-
companying.
"E.g., Murray v. Egan, 28 Conn. Supp. 204, 256 A.2d 844 (1969); Dunellen Bd. of Educ.
v. Dunellen Educ. Ass'n 64 N.J. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973).
"2E.g., Marta v.- Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608 (Del. 1968).
IsThe anti-delegation inspirations for the Rule are apparent in Judge Dillon's classic discus-
sion. See J. Dillon, supra note 5.
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be judged by their conduciveness to individual welfare, individual self-
realization, individual freedom.
Parts II and III of this essay will try to show that the "public purpose"
and "delegation" doctrines, as judicially fashioned and applied, suggest the
coexistence in the judicial mentality of two different, and contradictory,
models of local-government legitimacy (described in Part I)-an economic or
"public choice" model and a non-economic "public interest" or "community
self-determination" model.1 4 Part IV will compare the descriptive power of
these models in relation to a topic of current legal concern, local zoning. Part
V will try briefly to suggest what an irresolute duality of models might mean
for the intellectual situation of local-government law generally. Finally, Part
VI will trace some relationships between these apparent judicial conceptions
of local-government legitimacy and the theory that common-law adjudication
has historically been shaped by judicial striving to make the law economically
efficient.
I. Two MODELS OF LEGITIMACY
In the economic or public choice model, all substantive values or ends are
regarded as strictly private and subjective. The legislature is conceived as a
market-like arena in which votes instead of money are the medium of ex-
change. The rule of majority rule arises strictly in the guise of a technical
device for prudently controlling the transaction costs of individualistic ex-
changes.15 Legislative intercourse is not public-spirited but self-interested.
Legislators do not deliberate towards goals, they dicker towards terms. There
is no right answer, there are only struck bargains. 16 There is no public or
general or social interest, there are only concatenations of particular in-
terests or private preferences. There is no reason, only strategy;17 no persua-
sion, only temptation and threat. There are no good legislators, only shrewd
ones; no statesmen, only messengers;' 8 no entrusted representatives,only
tethered agents.' 9
"
4Compare the "two irreconcilable and mutually incomprehensible paradigms in political
thought" described and discussed in Salkever, Freedom, Participation and Happiness, 5 POL.
THEORY 391 (1977).
In speaking of a "judicial mentality" I mean to suggest the existence of a characteristic
judicial conciousness, not a collective one. Insofar as judicial habits of thought are conditioned
by more general ideological environments, my thesis is that the "second revolution in American
political thought" described by Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolu-
tionary America, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 467, 486-87 (1976), has never fully displaced the first. See
id. at 481-83.
15See generally J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK. THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
"See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114-41 (1975).
"
7 See, e.g, W. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
"On "messengers" see W. BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUION 193 (2d ed. 1872).
"Compare the views of Edmund Burke, as lucidly reviewed in H. PiTKIN. THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION 168-89, esp. at 176 (1967) [hereinafter cited as H. Pitkin].
[Vol. 53:145
COMPETITING JUDICIAL MODELS
The opposed, public-interest model depends at bottom on a belief in the
reality-or at least the possibility-of public or objective values and ends for
human action. 20 In this public-interest model the legislature is regarded as a
forum for identifying or defining, and acting towards those ends. The process
is one of mutual search through joint deliberation, relying on the use of
reason supposed-t have persuasive force. Majority rule is experienced as the
natural way of takg action as and for a group l -or as a device for filter-
ing the reasonable from the unreasonable, the persuasive from the unper-
suasive, the right from the wrong and the good from the bad. 22 Moral in-
sight, sociological understanding, and goodwill are all legislative virtues. 23
Representatives are chosen in part for their supposed excellence in such vir-
tues.2 4 This model, no doubt, is as sentimental as the public-choice model is
"Compare the "idealist position" described and criticized in K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES 81-86 (2d ed. 1963) (discussing views of Kant, Rousseau, T.H. Green, Frank
Knight, and others) [hereinafter cited as Arrow]. See also A. LEVINE, THE POLITIcs OF
AUTONOMY: A KANTIAN READING OF ROUSSEAUS SOCIAL COINTRAcr 56 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Levine].
211d. at 61.
22See id. at 64-66; Kuflik, Majority Rule Procedure, in NoMos XCIII: DUE PROCESS 296,
305-09 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Kuflik]. In the "idealist" view,
"the case for democracy rests on the argument that free discussion and expression of opinion are
the most suitable techniques of arriving at the moral imperative implicitly common to all.
Voting, from this point of view, is not a device whereby each individual expresses his personal in-
terests, but rather where each individual gives his opinion of the general will. This model has
much in common with the statistical problem of pooling the opinions of a group of experts to ar-
rive at a best judgment; here individuals are considered experts at detecting the moral im-
perative." K. Arrow, supra note 20, at 85. J. RAWLs. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 354-59 (1971), ap-
pears to combine the "pooling of views" (idealist, objectivist) notion with a version of the
"trading-off' (economic, subjectivist) notion in reaching a justification of majority rule. He calls
attention to the likelihood that pooling of views through discussion will improve decisions (regar-
ding what is just and, secondarily, expedient). Id. at 357-59:
Yet even with the best of intentions, . . . opinions of justice are bound to clash. In
choosing a constitution, then, and in adopting some form of majority rule,)the parties
accept the risks of suffering the defects of one another's knowledge and sense of justice
in order to gain the advantages of an effective legislative procedure. There is no other
way to manage a democratic regime. Nevertheless, when they adopt the'majority prin-
ciple the parties agree to put up with unjust laws only on certain conditions. Roughly
speaking, in the long-run the burden of injustice should be n1ore or less evenly
distributed over different groups in society, and the hardships of uInjust policies should
not weigh too heavily in any particular case.
Although Rawls' meaning is not crystal clear, the "certain conditions" limiting the parties'
tolerance for unjust laws seem to include (chiefly) the majority-rule system itself which supposedly
will tend to moderate concentration of injustice on any particular group. It may be, however,
that the "certain conditions" Rawls has in mind are substantive constraints like bills of rights and
minimum guaranties derived from the "two principles of justice." But that reading seems the less
plausible because those constraints would tend to moderate the distribution of burdens or costs,
not the distribution of "injustice." I
23See, e.g., H. Pitkin, supra note 19, at 169 (describing Burke's views).
24The precept of apportionment of district representatives b population-of "one person,
one vote" within the framework of a geographically districted representation scheme (e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1963))-seems easier to reconcile v.ith the "public interest" view
of the purpose of elections (choosing the best-qualified officials) t an with the "public choice"
view (making particular interests influential in proportion to their weights" in the population).
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unlovely; but though public interest may in that sense be a less "realistic" way
of looking at the world than public choice, I doubt that it is less real as a
description of our actual way of experiencing and interpreting our political
life; nor is it less real-and here is a major thesis of this essay-as a descrip-
tion of the way judges perceive that life.
Coexistence of the two opposed models of legitimacy may be connected
with a deep controversy in our philosophical tradition between opposed no-
tions of human freedom and value. On the one hand there is a tradition
deeply entrenched in Western thought-chiefly associated with Kant 25 and
Rousseau26 but apparently tracing back at least to Aristotle27 - that conceives
individual freedom in such a way that its attainment depends on the possibili-
ty of values that are communal and objective-jointly recognized by members
of a group and determinable through reasoned interchange among them. In
the conception advanced by Rousseau and Kant, freedom is the state of giv-
ing the law to oneself.28 This conception is, to put it a bit crudely, one of
self-regulation as opposed to self-indulgence. It implies that unfettered trade
in a perfectly free, competitive market cannot by itself constitute a person's
See generally Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One
Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 21-61. See also J.-J. ROUSSEAU. The Social Contract or Principles of
Political Right, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (Everyman's ed. 1950), at 68 ("By this
means [election] uprightness, understanding, experience, and all other claims to pre-eminence
and public esteem become so many further guarantees of wise government") [hereinafter cited as
J.J. Rousseau].21See note 28 infra.
26See id.
27Compare ARISTOTLE. POLITICS (J. Warrington tr.) in ARISTOTLrS POLITICS AND THE ATHE.
NIAN CONSTITUTION 156 (Everyman's ed 1959): "In extreme democracies . . . everyone lives a he
pleases, as Euripides says, 'for any end he happens to desire.' But this is an altogether unsatisfac-
tory conception of liberty. It is quite wrong to imagine that life subject to constitutional control
is mere slavery; it is in fact salvation." See E. BARKER. THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND
ARISTOTLE 355 (Dover ed. 1959). Durkheim is another notable contributor to this associational
conception of freedom. See E. DURKHEIM. SUICIDE 169-70, 210-15, 248-49, 289-90, 356 (J.
Spaulding & G. Simpson tr., 1951); R. WOLFF. THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 143-45 (1968).
28J.J. ROUSSEAU. supra note 24, at 9 ("to remove all liberty from [man's] will is to remove all
morality from his acts"); id. at 19 ("what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty ...
alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obe-
dience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty"); id. at 91: (the essence of the body
politic lies in the reconciliation of obedience and liberty"); J.-J. ROUSSEAU. EMILE 243 (Everyman
ed. 1911): "I am a slave in my vices, a free man in my remorse"); I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OFTHE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Paton tr., paper ed. 1964), at 108 ("If the will seeks the law that is to
determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own making of universal
law-if therefore in going beyond itself it seeks this law in the character of any of its objects-the
result is always heteronomy. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but the object does
so by virtue of its relation to the will"); Id. at 114 ("Will is a kind of causality belonging to liv-
ing things so far as they are rational. Freedom ,would then be the property this causality has of
being able to work independently of determination by alien causes . . . .What else then can
freedom of the will be but autonomy-that is, the property which will has of being a law to
itself?")
For the relevant connections between Kant's thought and Rousseau's, see A. Levine, supra
note 20; E. CASSIRER. ROUSSEAU, KANT. GOETHE 23, 31-32, 57 & passim (J. Gutmann tr. 1945).
See also E. CASSIRER, THE QUESTION OF JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU 63, 96-97, 107-15 (P. Gay tr.
1954) [hereinafter cited as Cassirer].
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freedom; for by itself free trade can be taken as a reflection of perfect
enslavement to wants or appetites that are not chosen but just impinge on
one inexplicably and uncontrollably. Freedom in the Kantian view must
mean choosing one's ends by an activity of reason. To think that something
called reason can liberate from the bondage of appetite is not to think that
such liberation is achieved merely by subordinating the immediate urgings of
impulsive desire to the calculated scheming of a longer-range plan. Reason in
such a long-range planning guise would still be merely technical, would still
function in the service of the reasoner in his ultimately unfree aspect of a car-
rier of unchosen wants. If reason can liberate from appetite, it can do so only
insofar as the reasoner can somehow rise above the question of what long-
range plan will best satisfy the present wants of the person as he is in the
world as it is, to deal rather with a question about how one is to become or
remain the person he wants to be, in the world he needs to live in if he is to
be that person.2 9 Reasoning in such a constitutive mode seems to involve con-
straint of choice by some principle or set of principles other than the princi-
ple of maximizing the satisfaction-even the long-range satisfaction-of one's
present wants.
There may be grounds for thinking 'that, for many if not all individuals,
the possibility of such a reasoned choice of ends will depend on the in-
dividual's functioning-by participation and commitment- as a member of a
group of persons engaged in making choices by which all members are
bound. s0 If so, then it is the case not only that freedom for individuals
22Compare M. HORKHEIMER. ECLIPSE OF REASON 46 (paper ed. 1974) (Platonic concept of
Ideas represents "the sphere of aloofness, independence, and in a certain sense even freedom, an
objectivity that [does] not submit to 'our' interests"). See also Knight, Ethics and the Economic
Interpretation, in THE ETHICS OF COMPErION AND OTHER ESSAYS 21, 22-23; id. at 26 (rather
than "act in order to live," men "live in order to act, they care to preserve their lives in the
biological sense in order to achieve the kind of life they consider worthwhile"); Knight, The Ethic
of Competition, in id. 41, at nn.41-42; id. at 69 ("The sort of person one is depends on the sort
of philosophy one chooses").
'OIt seems that special conditions are required in order that self-submission to chosen ends
may liberate from one enslavement (to random appetite) without simply substituting another (to
"chosen" ends or principles); and these special conditions may be most readily comprehensible as
attributes of collective choice within groups.
If the chosen principles are not to be themselves enslaving they must be open to change. But
if they are changeable at will (so as not to be enslaving), then how are they not just a kind of
glorified appetite, themselves not chosen but just randomly and inexplicably given to one? (Com-
pare Knight, Ethics and the Economic Interpretation, supra note 29, at 21, questioning whether
"life is a matter of economics.") What we seem to need for freedom are principles that are open
to a special kind of change-that is, change that is itself constrained by the principles. In other
words, principles that govern morally free choice must be such as are capable of evolutionary
change-change susceptible of reasoned criticism in terms of the very principles that are
themselves undergoing transformation. But what sort of principles might there by that could
satisfy all these conditions of constraint, openness, and continuity? There must be, at least, a set
of abstract principle to which members of a group commit themselves for the settlement of ques-
tions of joint concern-something like what John Rawls calls principles "of justice." (See, J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUS-rcE 3-6 (1971).) The openness of the principles would reside in their
abstractness, allowing a part of their meaning always to be held in abeyance, to be worked out
through the various, distinctive understandings of the several individual group members as ap-
1977-1978]
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depends upon the possibility of objective ends or values to which one can
commit oneself on principle; but also that for individuals in secular society
such ends or values will encompass matters of interpersonal relationship,
obligation, and respect and, for the freedom-seeking socialized individual,
political process will be both a medium for reasoning towards the ends (and
acting towards their attainment) and, at the same time, itself one of the ends.
And so the Kantian notion of freedom seems to be a link that connects a
public-interest model of politics with an objective stance towards values.
On the other hand there is a strictly individualist and subjectivist concep-
tion of human experience, a conception which serves as a foundation for
modern economic analysis.31 From this subjectivist conception can be derived
a strictly behavioristic interpretation of the notion of value, which interpreta-
tion may in turn lead to insistence that economic efficiency is the only social
good there is-or at least the only one that is amenable to neutral scientific
discussion. The general idea is that values, so-called, are taken to be nothing
but individually held, arbitrary and inexplicable preferences (the subjectivist
element) having no objective significance apart from what individuals are ac-
tually found choosing to do under the conditions that confront them (the
behaviorist element); from which it seems to follow that there can be no ob-
jective good apart from allowing for the maximum feasible satisfaction of
private preference as revealed through actual choice-or, in other words,
plication to specific cases is required. Their constraining force would reside in the commitment
to resolve specific cases consistently with them. And their continuity would reside in the insitu-
tionalized processes through which their application was specified and their meaning concretized,
processes which themselves would undergo evolutionary change constrained by the principles
which govern them. (The argument in this footnote owes much-perhaps all- to Tribe, How
Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Evironmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315,
1338-40 (1974), and R. WOLFF. Tss POVERTY OF LIBERALISM 191-93 (1968), concluding: "Kings
achieve freedom only when they converse with other kings. In that sense a free society is a society
of kings, and Kant was right to call his ideal moral community a kingdom of ends." It also
elaborates on a prior attempt of mine, Michelman, Conmments on Riker on National Planning
(unpublished paper delivered at Liberty Fund Conference on National Planning, Dec. 1975, at
22-24. A closely related conception of freedom- as consisting in participation in the ordering of
public affairs-is luminously portrayed on page after page of H. ARENDT. ON REVOLUTION (paper
ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as ARENDT.]. Dr. Arendt's stunningly expressed commendations of
freedom as "public happiness" (e.g., id. at 124), rest heavily on foundations other than' the Kan-
tian perception of the relation of freedom and principle; but her argument includes the latter, as
also it insists on the opposition of freedom to "prosperity" (id. at 133), to "desire" (id. at 136),
and to "private happiness" (id. at 273).)
"
tBut note that analytical use of the conception need not imply a belief that it is a true or
complete one. See ECONOmIC ANALYSIS at notes 45-46 infra & text accompanying.
The truly distinguishing mark of the neoclassical economic vision of human experience and
fulfillment is not its individualism but its subjectivism. That experience accrues to individuals
and not groups, that fulfilling experience depends on (if it isn't identical with) the individual's
and not the group's freedom, are assertions few modems would contest; but individual freedom is
one thing, and strict subjectivity-unfathomable privacy and arbitrariness-of all values is
another and quite different sort of thing. "X is free" says something about the relations among
X's motives, X's action and X's will or consciousness. "X's values (or ends) ar strictly subjective"
says something about the relations of X's motives to the motives of others. It is controversial
whether the state of freedom for individuals is attainable or maintainable in society without
societal acceptance of and respect for the supposed fact of strict value-subjectivity.
[Vol. 53:145
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through "willingness to pay." The resulting allocation of resources to their
highest-paying employments is the state known to economists as efficiency.32
Much like the link between the public-interest model and an objective
stance toward values, there seems to be a linkage between the economic
(public-choice) model and a subjective stance towards values, provided by
what we might call a Hobbesian or Lockean notion of freedom.33 To see how
this works, let us provisionally assume universal recognition of a set of
"natural" or pre-political individual rights-rights on the order of those to
dispose over and do something with one's body, mind, and capacities, and
also over and with those things of which one becomes the "owner" without
violating another's ownership -entitlements which translate into claims not to
be assaulted, enslaved, trespassed upon, robbed, defrauded. The exact con-
tent of such a basic set of individual natural rights, its derivation and
defense, are much-vexed questions not yet definitively answered in any of the
individualist literature from John Locke34 through James Buchanan5 and
Robert Nozick. 36 Also unanswered is the question whether any such pre-
political rights are necessary logical foundations for an economic theory of
the state.3 7 For the moment these problems can be assumed away, and
universal recognition (or deduction) of a set of basic rights-constitutive of
what might be called the "ethical individual"- can be supposed. The nor-
mative economic theory of governmental institutions can then be seen as pro-
ceeding at two levels. At the first level is what has been variously called the
"protective,138 or the "minimal,"' 9 or the "night-watchman"'4 state: Every in-
"2See, e.g., id. at notes 33-44 infra & text accompanying.
33See J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4-7 (§§ 4-8); 16-17 (§§26-27); 70-73
(§§123-31) (T. Peardon ed. 1952); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER. FORME AND POWER OF
A COMMONWEALTH ch. 5, at 43 (Collier Books ed. 1962): "[I]f a man should talk to me of afree
will; or anyfree, but free from being hindered by opposition, I should not say he were in an er-
ror, but that his words were without meaning, that is to say, absurd;" id. ch. 14, at 103: "By
LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of exter-
nal impediments: which impediments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he
would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according to his judgment, and
reason shall dicate to him;" T. Hobbes, The Citizen: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning
Government and Society, in T. HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN 228 (Anchor Books ed. 1972): "If they
suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few laws, few prohibitions, and those too such,
that except they were forbidden, there could be no peace; then I deny that there is more liberty
in democracy than monarchy .... For although the word liberty may in large and ample letters
be written over the gates of any city whatsoever, yet it is not meant the subject's but the city's
liberty"
1J. LOCKE. SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT (T. Peardon ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
LOcKE].
35J. BUCHANAN. THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEvIATHAN (1975)
[hereinafter cited as BUCHANAN].
36R. NoZICK, ANARCHY. STATE, AND UPTOPIA (1971) [hereinafter cited as NozicK].
"See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 35, at 9-11, 21-23. R. NOZICK. supra note 35, at 26-28,
33-35, 48-53, 57-59, 151-53. Locke's name, of course, is at or near the head of every list of
liberal theorists of prepolitical individual ("natural") rights. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, supra note 34, at
70-73 (c. IX).
"SBucHANAN, supra note 35, at 68.
"NozicK, supra note 36, at 26-27.
40See id. at 25, 26.
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dividual's basic entitlements will just obviously be worth more to the several
individuals (assuming, always, latent consensus on what everyone's basic en-
titlements are) if enforcement is guaranteed by an impartial institutional en-
forcer rather than left to self-help. But the protective state as thus explained
will be limited to articulating and enforcing obvious rules against assault,
trespass, fraud, theft, promise-breaking, and the like; and yet it is very plain
that our state (including our local governments) has gone far beyond that
role, and functions also at the second level, which Buchanan calls the
"productive state"41 and others have called the "welfare state" -producing not
only goods and services of a material kind but also regulatory programs (such
as zoning or environmental control) which cannot plausibly be palmed off as
mere realizations of the basic personal and proprietary entitlements of the
ethical individual. 42
Yet it is possible to give an individualistic-economic rationale for the
welfare state, too. In fact, at least two such accounts are available-what I
shall call the "big-bribe" and the "market-failure" accounts. The "big-bribe"
account will to many seem the less plausible, though perhaps only because it
is the less intricate. Its individualistic explanation of the welfare state is
directly parasitic on the simple theory of the protective or night-watchman
state. 43 Suppose we say the problem is to justify continued acceptance by the
relatively well-endowed-those who would be the best-off if everyone were left
unmolested in an ungoverned state of nature-of governmental authority to
tax and regulate for welfarish, redistributive or productive purposes. Then
the answer is that such acceptance is a price (or call it a bribe) those better-
endowed should find worth paying, in exchange for peaceful acceptance by
the naturally worse-endowed of the government's protective police authority.
To the naturally well-endowed, the expected net cost of governmental welfare
activities is supposed to be less than that of the combined expected costs of
self-defense and losses to predatory neighbors in a state of nature; while to
the naturally worse-endowed the expected value of the welfare activities is
supposed to be greater than what they could get by unrestricted predation.
Thus, welfare-state activities are viewed as a continuing incentive to abide by
and support the state's night-watchman function; and unswerving loyalty to
the constitutional framework that authorizes and generates both protective
and welfarish programs is venerated because nothing else stands between us
and deadly Civil Warre. 44
4'BUCHANAN, supra note 35, at 68.42See, e.g., Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis 390-
403, 86 YALE L.J. 385 (1977); B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrrHOUT ZONING (1972).
43What follows is a crude summary of a careful and complex argument in BUCHANAN.
supra note 35, at 53-73.
44This is the view apparently taken in Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality
of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 26-31. But cf. ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS. supra note 2, at 343 (last paragraph of § 24.3) (Constitution is designed to protect par-
ticular interests of powerful groups, not those of the powerless). It is of a piece with the one
taken in T. HOBBES. LEVIATHAN OR THE MATrER. FORME AND POWER OF A COMMONWEALTH
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The market-failure account, though rather more laborious than the big-
bribe account, may have more influence in contemporary interpretations of
our prevailing governmental institutions. The idea is to view government as
one of two great sub-systems-the private market is the other-which
together are supposed to achieve an individualistically optimal allocation of
resources. 45 Individuals come to market, so to speak, each with her or his own
current endowment of preferences, abilities, and property claims. Of course
the juxtapositions of these initial individual situations are always such that ex-
change transactions among two or more individuals would be advantageous
for both or all of them, each judging according to his or her own preferences.
Each such case of potential gains from trade involves an "externality"-a
situation in which some of the costs or some of the benefits of a person's ac-
tions (or inactions) accrue to other persons. Under behavioristic in-
dividualism, efficient resource allocation has for certain occurred only when
all costs acre borne, and all benefits enjoyed, by those who choose to produce
them or have them produced. The virtue of a free market is the tendency it
generates toward this state where externalities are all "internalized" by volun-
tary exchange transactions. Yet markets can sometimes fail to realize the op-
timum condition of complete internalization. Such failure is associated with
unusual difficulty (high transaction costs) in striking a bargain or in organiz-
ing all who would have to agree to participate in a transaction in order that
its potential, mutual benefits may be reaped. Such difficulty can result when
the number of persons who stand to benefit from a costly undertaking is'
large, and none of these potential beneficiaries can produce the benefit for
themselves without also making it available to others (whom it will not be
possible to exclude, at any cost or at feasible cost). Decisions about whether
to produce such benefits cannot be made efficiently through individual
bargaining and exchange unless a way can be found to induce each potential
beneficiary to make a lump-sum offer prior to production in exchange for the
privilege of free enjoyment once the good is produced. (The good might be a
capital facility like a bridge, or it might be provision for a specified period of
some public service such as street-cleaning or even of a regulatory program
such as zoning.) If that sort of before-the-fact bargaining were possible, then
the decision whether to produce would-efficiently-depend on whether the
(Oakeshott ed. 1962; Collier Books). Compare Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES
351, 66 (1973). For the argument connecting this rationale for welfare-state activities with a
majority-rule system (as well as some criticism of the argument), see Kuflik, supra note 22, at
298-301.
"For literature in this "public choice" vein see, e.g., A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1959); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) [hereinafter
cited as BUCHANAN & TULLOCK]; W. BAUMOL. WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE
(2d ed. 1965); E. HAEFELE, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
(1973); A. BRETON. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVER14MENT (1974); R. BISH.
THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS (1971) [hereinafter cited as BISH]; Buchanan,
Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene, 15 J.L.
& ECON. 439 (1972).
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total of the amounts offered equalled or exceeded the expected costs, in-
cluding capital costs, of production.
But the transaction costs of such bargaining will tend strongly to be pro-
hibitively high. Where large numbers of persons are involved, getting them
organized will itself be a costly operation. The difficulties are aggravated by
the likelihood of strategic concealment by free-loaders and hold-outs. Each
person, hoping or expecting that others will choose to pay for a good which
once produced will necessarily be available to the entire neighborhood or
community, will have some motivation to understate his true demand for the
good; and each will realize that all the others are subject to the same tempta-
tion. For such reasons a largish group of neighbors might well fail to provide
themselves with something like a jointly financed police patrol- and fail even
to make the attempt-even though, were the truth known, a bargain could
be struck which each would regard as privately advantageous.
Taught to appreciate this sort of problem, members of a residential com-
munity might unanimously agree to organize themselves into a political unit
within which decisions about investment in public goods and programs would
thenceforth be made collectively, typically by majority rule and very likely by
elected representatives. The key is the majority-rule rule, which will drastical-
ly reduce the transaction costs below those required for obtaining unanimous
agreement to a joint undertaking. 46 The charter of. government would spell
out the decision rules and procedures, would include rules for distributing
costs through taxes, and also would place some limits on the range of public
goods for which members were liable to be taxed and regulated. (Such goods
would undoubtedly include preferred environmental states, to be achieved by
regulation, as well as physical facilities and services to be achieved by pur-
chase of labor and materials.) Each member would realize that virtually every
public decision would depart in some measure from his or her true individual
preferences, and that on occasion such departures might be quite seriously
harmful to him or her. Public choice theorists have called such departures
"political externalities," in recognition that they are costs that some persons
are enabled to impose on others by majority rule. 47 Yet each member, by
subscribing to the arrangement, would signify an expectation that his or her
political-externality costs will over the long run be more than offset by gains
derived from the coordination that only a political, essentially majoritarian
mechanism can achieve at feasible transaction costs. Public choice literature
explores in detail- sometimes exquisite-the conditions (including such varied
matters as limits on substantive competency, procedural and decision rules,
representation arrangements, political-party organization, and boundary-
fixing criteria) under which political decisions might be expected to approach
46For thorough exploration, see BuCHANAN & TULLOCK. supra note 45.
4'E.g., BISH. supra note 45, at 37-42.
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long-run maximization, for each individual, of the excess of coordination sav-
ings over political costs. 48
41Some of the literature argues strongly against the plausibility of thinking that even a deft-
ly designed majoritarian process can churn out hunks of legislated settlements which are in-
dividualistically optimizing or waste-minimizing (i.e., approximate the settlements which would
have arisen in a market unburdened by insuperable transactions costs). At the heart of this
economically skeptical view of politics is a game-theoretic demonstration that even the most
acutely rational, self-interested agents in a multi-lateral, multi-focal political arena must-no less
than similarly rational agents in the private market-sometimes be blocked by strategic factors
from finding optimal trading partners and optimal deals. The political analogues to
"freeloading" and holding out" (see text accompanying notes 43-44 supra) include such behaviors
as strategic agenda manipulation, see, e.g., Kramer, Some Procedural Aspects of Majority Rule,
in NoMos XVIII: DUE PROCESS: 264 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman, eds. 1977); Levine & Plott,
Agenda Influence and Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561 (1977); and insincere voting, see, e.g.,
A. SEN. COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 192-94 (1970); R. BLACK, THEORY OF COMMIT-
TEES AND ELECTIONS 44-45 (1958). See generally W. RIKER & P. ORDESHOOK. AN INTRODUCTION TO
POsrIVE POLITICAL THEORY (1973).
We thus acquire an economic theory of "political failure" just parallel to that of market
failure (for which see text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.). Compare ECONOMIC ANALYSIS,
supra note 2, at 271 ("government failure"). But recognition of such failure is not inconsistent
with the persistence or appeal of an economic rationale for extant governmental institutions (or
of a kindred political ideology, see, e.g., Vincent Ostrom's econonic interpretation of Madiso-
nian republicanism in THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE COMPOUND REPUBLIC (1948)), which views
the combination of market and governmental sectors as aimed at minimizing the economy's total
of deadweight and transactions losses.
Now of course the economically inspired litereature on "political failure," as I have termed
it, may give grounds for skepticism about the real-world likelihood that partial substitutions of
political for market frameworks, in the forms and degrees characteristic of the modern welfare
state, will actually work out efficiently. That literature does not, however, reveal any logical gap
or inconsistency in the (no doubt optimistic) stories that can be told about how aptly designed
governmental institutions might improve the economy's over-all efficiency. The skeptical political-
failure literature must be sharply distinguished from another branch of economic analysis of
collective-choice schemes, typified by the distinguished contributions of Kenneth Arrow (SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2d ed. 1963)) and A.K. Sen (COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE (1970)), which does demonstrate certain logical "impossibilities" regarding the co-
existence in collective-choice schemes of various combinations of appealing, formal properties.
Although occasionally (and carelessly) mischaracterized as demonstrating the futility of collective
choice from an economic (efficiency) standpoint, the Arrow/Sen literature neither pretends to
nor results in any such demonstration.
As Sen puts it (COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE, at 26), Arrow "is concerned with
rules of collective choice which make the preference ordering of a society a function of individual
preference orderings, so that if the latter set is specified, the former must be fully determined."
Roughly translated and expanded, what this means is that Arrow wants to know whether there
are collective-choice procedures (or formulas) which (i) take as their only inputs the several order-
ings, of possible social states, respectively preferred by the several individual members of society
(where individual preference-orderings satisfy certain formal conditions of rationality and internal
consistency), and (ii) somehow combine those so as to produce a determinate and consistent
social preference ordering of the possible social states such that, as between any pair of alter-
native social states, either one is socially preferred to the other or society prefers both equally
(but more or less than some other possibility). What Arrow, Sen, and their colleagues show is the
logical impossibliity of there being some such procedure or formula for combining individual
preference orderings so as to get determinate and consistent social preference orderings, which
procedure also has (some or all of) various appealing, formal properties, such as: equal respon-
siveness to the preference orderings (or changes therein) of each individual; avoidance of both
dictatorship (determination by the preference orderings of a single individual) and imposition
(determination by some rule or criterion extraneous to everyone's preference orderings); con-
sistency with the criterion of Pareto-superiority (any alternative (in a pair) preferred by some in-
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II. PUBLIC CHOICE THINKING IN PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
Whether either the big-bribe or the market-failure version of the nor-
mative economic (public-choice) account of government can ultimately suc-
ceed in reconciling familiar majoritarian institutions with strictly economic
(subjectivist and individualist) premises is a question that deserves attention 9
but is not crucial to our present purpose, which is to see how either version, if
dividuals and dispreferred by none is socially preferred); positive association with individual
preferences (whan someone upgrades a given alternative on his list and one one downgrades it,
society doesn't downgrade it).
The various "possibility theorems" that can be extracted from this problem are, in various
ways and various degrees, ethically unsettling. But they do not seem to show (or be intended to
show) that astute use of collective-choice schemes, such as majority voting, cannot in fact im-
prove effeciency by reducing misallocations and/or transaction costs. One intuitive, though crude
and inexact, statement of a reason why the theorems do not show any such thing is that they
construe voting as a static kind of "%ounting" mechanism for registering individual preferences
and combining them into a social preference, not (as it is construed from the "public choice"
standpoint), as a dynamic kind of market-continuation process in which (through log-rolling)
prices accrue in the form of vote-trades across measures rather than in the form of money or
other commodities. A better statement may be that Arrow and Sen search for ways for registering
the ethical (e.g., distributional), as well as the strictly private, preferences of individuals in or
through the "social welfare function," a complication that an individualistic conception of effi-
ciency (and it associated rationales for both market and collective choice schemes) disregards.
Elaboration of these points would carry us well beyond the scope of this essay, but readers
wishing to pursue them might begin by consulting Arrow at 7, 59 ("the market mechanism," too,
fails to "create a rational social choice"); id. at 109-09; Sen at 26, 81, 161-62, 194 ("under some
circumstances game considerations and vote trading may help to bring in some measures- of in-
tensities of individual preferences, and a vote-trading equilibrium does reflect a compromise of
conflicting interests"). See also BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 45, at 332, 359 n. 14; K. AR-
ROW, THE LimsS OF ORGANIZATION (1974), at 33 ("organizations," explicitly including govern-
ments, "are a means of achieving the benefits of collective action where the price system fails"),
53 ("the functional role of organizations is to take advantage of the superior productivity of joint
actions"), 69 (". . authority, the centralization of decision-making, serves to economize on the
transmission and handling of information").
41One obvious problem is that the imaginalbe unanimous agreement (to submit to a ma-
joritarian regime of limited competency) remains utterly hypothetical. It isn't just that some are
thrust without choice (that is, born) into subservience to a national and a state con-
stitution and a local government charter. New local-government charters continue to
be created and imposed on non-consenting adults by non-unanimous procedures. And
in these cases, individualistic postulates cannot be satisfied by any argument that these
very [same] political institutions would necessarily emerge if each member of the group
would only act in accordance with rational self-interest; that argument can expalin the
use of non-unanimous charter-making procedures only by admitting that some real
persons in fact refuse to act in the way prescribed as rational, and ethical in-
dividualism (I think) demands a full measure of respect even for those persons and
their preferences. Nor are the postulates satisfied by the claim that given enough time
and effort we could in fact persuade each and every member of the group to support
imposition of the governmental institutions, and use of coercive charter-making pr-
rocedures is therefore justified as a means of saving this time and effort; ethical in-
dividualism will not (I think) countenance coercion based on your assumption that
those who disagree with you will after full discussion come 'round to your view (for
how can you know it won't turn out just the other way?) Nor can I think of any other
argument that honestly faces and solves the problem.
F. Michelman, Comments on Riker on National Planning, (Dec. 1975) (unpublished paper
delivered at Liberty Fund conference on National Planning)
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accepted, might work to explain judicial behavior that could otherwise be
thought puzzling in the doctrinal areas of public purpose and delegation.
Beginning with the public purpose doctrine, imagine that a city govern-
ment is about to use tax revenues to assemble a parcel of downtown real
estate, which parcel it has specially negotiated to sell to a certain private
developer for an amount somewhat below acquisition cost. The developer will
be committed to construct and operate a hotel and a parking garage on the
site. One hundred parking spaces will be made available at no charge to the
city for use as a public parking facility. The city, all admit, would otherwise
have deemed it worthwhile, in the interest of downtown revitalization, to
assemble a site and develop 100 spaces itself, at a cost slightly in excess of the
loss it will realize from buying the site for a higher price than it will get from
the developer on resale. At the same time, the developer's financial plans
disclose his anticipation of an immense profit on the deal, of a magnitude
that dwarfs any reasonable appraisal of the modest net benefit that the city
expects to derive. 50 The city council has approved the deal.
"
5Alert, economics-minded readers may have questions about the economic logic of the ex-
ample: First, what is the economic (or legal) justification for the city's acting to acquire the site
for the developer rather than letting him acquire it privately? Second, how is the developer (in
effect) able to sell to the city 100 parking spaces for less than it would cost the city to accomplish
"in house" construction of the same spaces on the same site? Third, why should the assembled
site be sold by special negotiation to a developer who anticipates a huge profit-rather than, for
example, offered at auction where someone willing to accept a more modest profit might confer
on the taxpayers the benefit of a higher price?
Possible answers are: First, it may be believed that an integrated, large-scale development
represents the most efficient use for this land area, but that problems associated with fragmented
ownership (including hold-out/free-loader problems and clouded titles) are blocking such
development from arising in the market. See, e.g., Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Urban
Renewal 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 105 (1961). In this situation, exercises of eminent domain
powers will be an effective and legally available solution. See, C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING,
423-47 (2d ed. 1971). The city's possession of eminent domain authority, then, explains its site-
assembly role. Second, the developer may have a development-cost advantage over the city for
the 100 parking spaces, by reason either of economies of specialization, see, e.g., A. SMrrH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS. Bk. I, ch. I (Modern Library
ed. 1937), or of scale or other economies arising out of his doing other development work in the
neighborhood simultaneously with construction of the parking spaces. Third, the size of the
developer's anticipated profit may represent the high level of risk in his line of business, or a long
lead time and large volume of entrepreneurial effort invested in "packaging" the deal, or a
return to a rare and socially valued feat of entrepreneurial imagination. The city's willingness to
negotiate such sales on terms allowing large profits may reflect a judgment that no practical
alternative is better calculated to maximize the social benefits from such entrepreneurial feats. A
simple auction sale to the highest bidder gives no opportunity to extract public benefits such as
cheap parking spaces (or, in other words, risks allowing the highest bidder a larger share of the
surplus than he would be willing to accept.) An auction sale with a minimum price (aimed at
reserving some minimum amount of surplus for the taxpayers) risks driving away too many bid-
ders. Advertising the possible availability of the site, and a willingness to negotiate with interested
developers, may seem the best alternative. (Of course there is another possible explanation for
the city's intervention, the negotiated sale, the developer's large profit-i.e., developer influence
on the conduct of city officials. That possibility is considered in the text. The point of this note is
just to confirm that there may be (a court cannot as a matter of logic say there isn't), from the
standpoint of city residents and taxpayers, an economically valid rationale for the city's part in
the deal.)
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A city taxpayer is seeking to enjoin the city from proceeding, on the sole
ground that the deal will involve expenditure of tax revenues for a non-public
purpose. The plaintiff does not dispute the legality of spending public funds
on revitalization or on parking spaces reasonably deemed necessary, to
revitalization. The objection, rather, is to the private developer's profitable
involvement. No statutory or constitutional text is cited, but all concerned
take it for granted that some sort of public purpose limitation is implied
either in the constitutional grant of taxing power to the state or in the state
constitution's due process guaranty.5
Faced with this sort of problem, a court seems to have a choice among at
least four strategies for review:
(1) Strictly procedural review. The court looks only to see that the city
council in reaching its decision has complied with the legislative procedures
established by or under the constitution, statutes, and home rule charter if
any, and that no specific rules against bribery, conflict of interest, or the like,
have been violated. The court refuses to reexamine the merits or even the
bare substantive rationality of the council's judgment.5 2
(2) Ad hoc substantive (rational basis) review. The court ascertains
whether a city council, acting in good faith, could rationally conclude that
the total (net) benefits to municipal citizens from this particular deal
"See note 7 supra.
52This is the stance recommended by Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 26-31. See also ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 495-96. It isn't clear that the courts in any American jurisdiction ac-
tually carry self-restraint this far. The most likely candidate may be the post-New Deal United
States Supreme Court. Cf., e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (extreme deference
to legislative classifications when reviewing economic regulations under equal protection clause).
Yet that Court's abstemiousness in "economic" cases more certainly reflects a restrictive view of a
national court's role in a federal system than a doubt about the existence of a substantive,
judicially enforceable legal doctrine restricting exercises of public powers to public purposes.
That such a substantive doctrine is a component of the Fourteenth Amendments due process
guaranty was expressly declared in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158
(1896). In Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920), the Court accorded a highly restrained review
in a "public purpoe" case, explaining (id. at 239-40, 242): "[T]he people, the legislature, and the
highest court of the State have declared the purpose . . . to be . . . public . . . and within the
taxing power of the State. With this united action of people, legislature and court, we are not at
liberty to interfere unless it is clear beyond reasonable controversy that rights secured by the
Federal constitution [including an acknowledged right not to be taxed for a nonpublic purpose,
citing Fallbrook, id. at 2383] have been violated. . . . [What is] . . . a public use [is] a question
concerning which local authority, legislative and judicial, has special means of securing informa-
tion . . . and . . . the judgment of the highest court of the State declaring a given use to be
public . . . [will] be accepted by this court unless clearly unfounded." In Carmichael v. Southern
Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937), the Court again accorded a substantive-though
restrained-review, saying (id. at 514): "It is not denied that since the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment state taxing power can be exerted only to effect a public purpose . . . [but]
the requirements of due process leave free scope for the exercise of a wide legislative discretion .... "
The views expressed in Fallbrook, Green, and Carmichael have never, so far as I am aware, been
repudiated by the Court.
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(including those from the public good of revitalization) will exceed their total
(net) tax and other costs, and on that basis grants or denies relief.53
(3) "Per se" or categorical substantive review. The court ascertains
whether the project entails in any degree the use of the city's taxing power in




(4) Primary-purpose or weighing-of-benefits review. The court ascertains
whether the private benefits to the entrepreneur clearly predominate over the
public benefits, and on that basis grants or denies relief.55
First note that courts in such cases rarely, if ever, purport to limit
themselves to strictly procedural review (which would amount to rejecting the
public purpose doctrine). 56 This fact suggests that the "big bribe" justification
of the welfare state has not been strongly operative in the judicial mentality.
"This is probably the typical judicial stance. The substantive conception of a "valid"
legislative decision as one calculated to yield social benefits in excess of social costs is combined
with an institutional posture of judicial deference to legislative judgments about such questions,
within the bounds of plausibility or "rationality." See, e.g., Wilson v. Board of County Commis-
sioners, 327 A.2d 488, 498, 499 (Md. 1974) (legislative expenditure decision must "be reasonable
and based on ... honest judgment ... that the expenditure is for the best interests of the city;"
whether private firm will also benefit is "not a critical factor.")
S4See Foster v. Medical Care Comm'n, 283 N.C. 110, 195 S.E.2d 517 (1973); Lowell v. City
of Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1875) (following exception for privately owned public utilities). Many
state constitutions contain express prohibitions against "lending of credit" to any "corporation" or
"private" organization. Such prohibitions are sometimes construed by courts to bar all financial
truck with private enterprise. E.g., Port of Longview v. Taxpayers, 84 Wash. 2d 475, 527 P.2d
263 (1974), modified, 85 Wash. 2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1975). Such decisions, however, are not
directly relevant to my argument. See text accompanying notes 5, 6 supra.
55A clear and striking example is Price v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 422 Pa. 317, 221
A. 2d 138 (1966). In Basehore v. Hampden Industrial Dev. Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 28 A. 2d 212
(1969), the court sought to distinguish the Price case and to deny that it had there used a
primary-purpose constitutional test, explaining that (i) in Price there wasn't any "substantial"
public benefit and (ii) the Price decision turned on interpretation of an enabling statute, not on
any constitutional public-purpose doctrine. But this retrospect on Price is thoroughly unper-
suasive, because: (i) the Price opinion (221 A. 2d at 150-51 n. 35) expressly stipulated that "we
find it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the Authority had acted unreasonably in con-
cluding that present and anticipated future need in the locale of the proposed garage facility
were sufficient to warrant its cosistruction. Assuming arguendo the existence of such need, the
Authority may not propose to meet it through the medium of a project which results in an over-
whelming and predominate benefit to private developers;" and (ii) while it is technically correct
that in Price the court held that the challenged deal was unauthorized under the "public benefit"
language of the enabling statute, it is also true that the opinion's argument is founded on an
analogy to the constitutional "public use" restriction on eminent domain powers, and that the
opinion speaks in tones suggesting a question of broader significance than the meaning of a park-
ing authority enabling act.
It should be noted that some jurisdictions, and some single decisions, appear to require, for
a valid public expenditure, both a substantial net public benefit and relegation of any non public
benefit to a secondary or "incidental" magnitude. Compare Wilson v. Board of County Commis-
sioners, 327 A.2d 488 (Md. 1974) with City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9, 136 A. 2d 852
(1957). (upholding industrial development bond; restrained judicial review; "whether. private
benefits outweigh . .. public benefits - . . [is] primarily a legislative rather than a judicial pro-
blem"); see Opinion of the Justices, 369 N.E.2d 447 (Mass. 1977); Port Authority of City of St.
Paul v. Fisher, 275 Minn. 157, 145 N.W. 2d 560 (1966).
"See note 52 supra.
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Under that conception, it will be recalled, we buy civil peace for the price of
abiding by whatever the duly constituted legislative process presents us with.57
Many courts, applying the public purpose limitation, will purport to
follow our second path, of ad hoc rational-basis review. This might seem at
least consistent with a market-failure justification of the welfare state, insofar
as a reasonably anticipated surplus or deficit, as the case may be, of social
benefits from a public good (revitalization) over political costs (taxes)
represents a net positive or negative contribution to the total long-run,
public-sector benefit-cost balance which, when distributed over the citizenry,
can supposedly make each better off than would have been possible without
welfare-state activity. Yet one may well ask why procedurally regular and
non-corrupt legislative (city council) approval is not itself deemed sufficient to
provide this assurance, without any substantive judicial oversight. A plausible
(though certainly not a logically irresistable) answer is that restrained,
rational-basis judicial review simply provides a cost-effective screening device
to catch some obvious, legislative mistakes which would otherwise inevitably
occur from time to time-because legislators, too, are fallible-and detract
from the long-run total benefit-cost balance.58 Thus it seems at this point
"Professor Posner, whose normative theory and positive model of politics and legislation
seem closely akin to what I have been calling the "big bribe" theory, believes (it would seem cor-
rectly) that total judicial abstention from "public purpose" review is an implication of the theory.
If particular legislation is not designed to contribute to social welfare (because it is purely respon-
sive to private interests operating as "pressure groups"), it makes no -possible sense for courts to
treat the legislation on the assumption that it is so designed. See Posner's discussions cited in
notes 44, 54 supra.
Still, it could always be argued that the "duly constituted" process includes a step of
substantive judicial review; but if we follow that path the big bribe conception will, from the
judicial standpoint, just collapse into some other conception. Suppose the judge infers from some
authoritative source or text (e.g., the due process clause of the state or federal constitution) that
the legislature's public expenditure decisions are supposed to be subject to some sort of substan-
tive judicial check for "suitability," or "propriety" or whatever. If all the court can tell (from the
texts and from authoritative history) about the reason for thrusting this vaguely defined role
upon it is that such was part of the constitutional settlement by which civil peace was to be
established, it will still have to find some way of answering the open questions about the precise
standards, or purposive guides, to be used in performing the role. If the court for some reason
has adopted economic efficiency as its residual guide (for use when the sacred texts run out), it
will be driven to decide what standard (from among numbers (2), (3), and (4), see notes 53-55
supra & text accompanying, or some variant of those) best accords with some economically
plausible account of American governmental institutions and practices. So the economics-minded
judge in this situation will have to fall back from the big-bribe account to the market-failure ac-
count, or something like it.5 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments On the Ethical Foundations of
'7ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1177-78 (1967).
Another imaginable answer would be that a judicial determination of "no public purpose"
represents a judicial finding of inefficiency plus a judicial perception (or intuition) that the
measure under review is a product of one of those occasions of "political failure," of economic
misfire of the self-interest motivated political process, referred to in note 48 supra-so that the
judicial finding of inefficiency is not contradictory of any genuinely opposed legislative result.
But while this answer is imaginable, it is hardly plausible. Partly for reasons yet to be explored,
the notion that courts by some mental process could even intuit, much less perceive, that some
particular measure was especially likely to be a "misfire" case, is, well, fantastic. See note 102,
infra.
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that either procedural review only, or procedural plus rational-basis review,
might be reconcilable with a market-failure account (though only procedural
review is consistent with a big-bribe account).
But if that much be granted, then why should courts applying public
purpose ever lapse-as some courts sometimes do-into the per se or
categorical mode of review in which direct governmental aids to private
enterprise are automatically ruled out regardless of their apparent net positive
contribution to the long-run public-sector accounts?59 To see how the public-
choice model can also accommodate this per se variation, first consider the
fourth review strategy which some courts use: the "primary purpose" or
"weighing-of-benefits" approach. Applying that approach to our hypothetical
case, the court would ascertain that the private benefits to the developer
clearly overshadow the public benefits and on that basis would grant relief.
But why deprive the public of even a modest benefit-a modest positive con-
tribution tc the long-run public-sector balance-just because the developer
benefits hugely?
The answer, in a public-choice framework, can only lie in residual
mistrust of the integrity of the legislative process-or more precisely, in the
representation element in that process. The very fact that the total surplus
from the land-development transaction is divided so unevenly between the
developer and the city may raise suspicion that the legislators have not really
been pursuing the interests of their constitutents but rather have been "cap-
tured" by the private interest in some obscure or subtle way that bribery and
conflict laws cannot touch, and restrained substantive review cannot detect.
Confidence that surpluses from exercises of governmental powers will be wide-
ly and evenly enough distributed to assure that everyone will be a long-run
net gainer may depend significantly on the legislative representative's always
being actually responsive to popular, constituent interest.60 Periodic electoral
accountability is supposed to induce such responsiveness through the medium
of legislator self-interest (in retaining office, or at least in raising campaign
contributions). Maldistribution of surpluses to private parties might so strong-
ly suggest the presence of a countervailing legislator self-interest that a wisely
fashioned public-choice system would program courts in such cases to in-
tervene prophylactically. 6' Categorically ruling out all specially negotiated
governmental assistance to private enterprise-that is, the per se rule-would
just be a more extreme version of the same type of prophylaxis.
So it seems, at least to this point, as though any of three versions of
judge-created public purpose doctrine-the rational-basis, primary-purpose,
and per se or categorical variants-can plausibly be reconciled with an in-
s'See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
"0That is, whatever such confidence is able to survive the skeptical literature described in
note 48, supra.
"IThe opinion in Price v. Philadephia Parking Auth., 422 Pa. 317, 221 A.2d 138 (1966),
certainly suggests this sort of concern.
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dividualistic type of normative economic model of government, depending on
what the model's design details are supposed to be. That might seem a pretty
bit of evidence to support a general thesis that individualistic economics is the
hidden inspiration of judge-made doctrine even in public law. Yet a small fly
in that ointment is an awareness that a fourth and rarely professed op-
tion-rejection of public purpose as a judicially enforceable substantive
limitation in favor of strictly procedural review-is also consistent with a
plausibly designed public-choice model. 62
Let that problem rest for a moment. A second intriguing pattern of
judicial behavior concerns a small portion of delegation doctrine represented
by a trio of Supreme Court decisions which, taken together, have posed a
long-standing puzzle to legal theorists.
Case I: Eubank v. Richmond (1912).6s The Virginia legislature had by
statute authorized city councils "to make regulations concerning the building
of houses . . ., and in their discretion, . . . in particular districts . . . to
prescribe and establish building lines .... ." The Richmond City Council
thereupon adopted an ordinance providing, in effect, a procedure whereby
two-thirds of the owners along any block could adopt their own building set-
back line for their block. That procedure was used to establish a line that
would have required the plaintiff to alter his plans for a house not yet built.
The Supreme Court held that allowing the ordinance thus to be enforced
against the plaintiff would unconstitutionally deprive him of his property.
Although the Court's opinion hints at a straight substantive due process
objection to legislative regulation of building lines (the year, remember, was
1912), the opinion as a whole (and subsequent decisions) makes clear that the
decision does not rest on that. The crucial objection was, rather, to the
delegation feature of the Richmond ordinance which "enable[d] the conve-
nience or purposes of one set of property owners to control the property rights
of others." Because the ordinance "create[d] no standard by which [this]
power [was] to be exercised," those exercising it might "do so solely for their
own interest or even capriciously.1 64
Case II: Cusack v. Chicago (1916).6s The Supreme court upheld a city or-
dinance which excluded billboards from predominantly residential blocks ex-
cept when a majority of the owners in the block would give written consent.
The unsuccessful plaintiff was a would-be sign builder who, apparently
62See note 52, supra and accompanying text. If the public-choice model is so supple that it
can be reconciled with things courts don't do, as well as with various (mutually inconsistent)
things various courts do do, then what does it explain? A theory that can logically claim to ex-
plain whatever might be observed, and so is not empirically falsifiable (e.g., the theory that
whatever happens is the mechanical result of chains of collisions of particles set in motion at the
Creation), doesn't explain anything. See Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J.
EcON. 335, (1974) [hereinafter Posner II] "It is, of course, a weakness rather than a strength in a
theory that it is so elastic as to fit any body of data with which it is likely to be confronted."





unable to garner majority consent, attacked the ordinance on delegation
grounds, complaining that it left his fate to "the whims and caprices" of his
"neighbors. '"66 Not surprisingly, he leaned heavily on Eubank. The Court
pulled this prop from under him by reasoning that the delegation feature of
the Chicago ordinance could only help him, not hurt him. Eubank was
distinguished on the ground that there it was the unofficial body of self-
interested neighbors who did the dirty work of imposing the prohibition,
while in Cusack it was the city councillors who did that, while the neighbors
were simply empowered to confer the favor of an exception: "The one or-
dinance permits two-thirds of the lot owners to impose restrictions upon the
other property in the block, while the other permits one-half of the lot owners
to remove a restriction from the other property owners. This is not a delega-
tion of legislative power .. 67 Justice McKenna, author of the Eubank opi-
nion, dissented.
Case III: Washington ex rel. Seattle Title & Trust Co. v. Roberge
(1928). 68 A landowner wishing to construct a charitable home for aged poor
persons in a residentially zoned area, but apparently unable to gain the con-
sent of neighboring landowners, succesfully challenged the constitutionality of
Seattle's zoning provision permitting "a philanthropic home for children or
for old people . . . in first residence district when the written consent shall
have been obtained of the owners of two thirds of the property within four
hundred (400) feet of the proposed building." 69 This provision was a 1925
amendment to a pre-existing ordinance which had simply omitted such homes
from the list of uses allowed in the first residence district. Given the less-
than-satisfying earlier decisions with which the Court had to cope, perhaps it
is not surprising that its Roberge opinion is a welter of confusion and incon-
sistency from which it is impossible to extract any precise, uncontradicted
statement of the constitutional defect found in the Seattle ordinance:
The right of the [owner] to devote its land to any legitimate use is pro-
perty within the protection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed by the
record"0 make it clear that the exclusion of the new home from the first
district is not indispensable to the general zoning plan. And there is no
legislative determination that the proposed building and use would be incon-
sistent with . . . general welfare. The enactment itself plainly implies the





"The tract "is located about 6 miles from the business center of Seattle, on a tract 267 feet
wide, . . . having an average depth of more than 700 feet and an area of 5 acres . . . . The
structure would he located 280 feet from the avenue on the west and about 400 feet from the
lake on the east, cover 4 per cent of the tract, and be mostly hidden by trees and shrubs. The
distance between it and the nearest building on the south would be 110 feet, on the north 160,
and on the west 365." Id. at 117.
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the land within 400 feet of the proposed building authority-uncontrolled by
any standard or rule prescribed by legislative action-to prevent the (owner]
from using its land for the proposed home .... They are not bound by any
official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrari-
ly, and may subject the [plaintiff] to their will or caprice . . . . The delega-
tion so attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of the 14th Amend-
ment. Eubank v. Richmond ....
Thomas Cusack v. Chicago . . . was held unlike Eubank v. Richmond,
supra, and the ordinance [there] was fully sustained. The facts found were
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that such billboards would or were liable
to endanger the safety and decency of [residential] districts . . . . It is not
suggested that the proposed new home for aged poor would be a nuisance ....
The facts shown clearly distinguish the proposed building and use from such
billboards or other uses which by reason of their nature are liable to be of-
fensive.
As the attempted delegation cannot be sustained, and the restriction
thereby sought to be put upon the permission is arbitrary and repugnant to
the due process clause . . . the [owner] is entitled to have the permit applied
for.
We need not decide whether, consistently with the 14th Amendment, it
is within the power of the state or municipality by a general zoning law to ex-
clude the proposed new home from a district defined as is the first district in
the ordinance under consideration .
7
Highlighted and reduced to its essentials, the logic of the Court's discus-
sion comes to this: (1) The facts do not themselves suggest that the plaintiffs
proposed rest home would be so disturbing to neighboring land uses as to call
for restrictions on the plaintiffs free use of its property. (2) Nor has the city
legislature exercised the responsibility of determining that the potential
disturbance to others is such as to justify restricting the plaintiffs freedom.
(3) So the Seattle scheme is simply one for sacrificing the plaintiffs freedom
to the caprice of his neighbors. It is thus just like the scheme condemned in
Eubank and it is, just as that one was, an improper attempt to delegate
legislative power which violates the due process guaranty. (4) Of course the
form of the Seattle scheme is of the kind which the Court held in Cusack is
not a delegation of legislative power at all (that is, it empowers neighbors to
lift a legislatively imposed restriction, not to impose a restriction
themselves) - which was admittedly the reason given in Cusack for
distinguishing that case from Eubank. (5) But this case differs from Cusack in
that there the facts showed billboards to be noxious intruders in residential
neighborhoods, while here the facts fail to indicate that the plaintiffs rest
home would be a noxious intruder in its neighborhood. So the plaintiffs pro-
perty rights prevail and it does not matter whether the scheme is labeled a
delegation or not. (6) Given the delegation feature in the Seattle scheme, it is
unnecessary to decide in this case whether this Seattle ordinance would have




ly excluded all rest homes from the first residence district. (7) On this in-
conclusive and mystifying note the Court ends.
Now one wants to think that there must be better, truer reasoning than
that to support the Court's conclusion not only that the Seattle ordinance
should be struck down but also that both the Eubank and Cusack decisions
should be reaffirmed. 72 As presented, after all, the three cases form a puzzl-
ing triangle. The Cusack Court's professed reason for upholding the Chicago
scheme, while reaffirming disapproval of the Richmond one, seems an uncon-
vincing triumph of form over substance. But if that formal distinction is
taken seriously, the Seattle scheme is like Chicago's, not Richmond's; and yet
Seattle's scheme is treated like Richmond's, not Chicago's-that is, it is in-
validated. What is needed is to see whether economically inspired public-
choice thinking can help one get beneath the Court's inadequate formal
analysis so as to reach more telling explanatory factors that can reconcile the
actual decisions.
The exercise may begin by deepening bewilderment. Viewing the Eubank
and Roberge cases through the lens of public-choice theory, which regards
governmental power as intentionally responsive to the private concerns of in-
dividuals, those decisions seem more wrong than ever. It seems as though the
decentralization schemes were a refinement and purification, rather than a
corruption, of privatistically geared democratic process. Since no one need be
concerned about the existence or location of a setback line or rest home ex-
cept the owners and residents in the immediate vicinity, the decentralization
schemes have the seemingly desirable effect of maximizing the direct in-
fluence in each such decision of the individuals directly affected by it. The
insight that participants in the process would each look out for their own
private interests, being the very assumption of economic theories of govern-
ment, can hardly count as a valid objection. Nor, for the same reason, can it
be objectionable that the affected individuals act for themselves directly
rather than through the imperfect and corruptible medium of legislative
representation. One's puzzlement may be reinforced by looking forward in
time to 1936 and Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Court in the Carter
Coal Company case, invalidating, on delegation grounds, a congressional
authorization and incentive to coal producers and miners to enact by majority
rule a legally enforceable labor code for their own industry. 7" The Court call-
ed the congressional scheme "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
72The reasoning in Roberge has often found confused. See e.g., Hogue, Eastlake and Arling-
ton Heights: New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land Use, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 41, 48-51
(1977). [hereinafter cited as Hogue] We can grant the legal realists their predictable claim that
the best explanation for any logical inconsistencies among the decisions lies in such extra-
doctrinal factors as turnover in the Court's personnel, changes in political ideologies or relative
influence of Justices, etc. Our question nevertheless persists, for we are looking at things from the
standpoint of the Justices who issued and agreed to the Roberge opinion, and trying to figure out
how they could have thought the three decisions were mutually consistent.
"1Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
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form, for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presump-
tively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often
are adverse to the interests of others" participating in and subject to the
regulatory scheme.7 4 And yet in economic theory legislative officials are not
"presumptively disinterested" but rather supposed to pursue the particular in-
terests of their constituents.
On second look a good market-failure explanation for the Eubank deci-
sion may be detected. In both variants of the normative economic theory of
government,7 6 government is regarded as a necessary evil-a generator of
political externality costs worth bearing only because and insofar as they
replace even larger market externality costs. The latter are the costs of
discoordination resulting from market failure.76 Market failure is a problem
typically associated with high transaction costs arising out of strategic
behavior in large-number bargaining situations. But the Richmond Council's
very act of adopting a blockfront decentralization scheme implies its judg-
ment that the relevant bargaining group- consisting of the property owners
within a relevant spillover area-need be no larger than the number of
owners within a block; and that number may be small enough that the tran-
saction costs should not be expected to overwhelm a private-market deal bin-
ding each owner to a restrictive covenant establishing a consensually accepted
building line. 7 7 Thus there may be insufficient market-failure justification in
14 d. at 311.75That is, the "big-bribe" and "market-failure" variants. See text accompanying notes
40-46, supra.
"
8 The big bribe variant focuses on the costs of predation and defense in a state of nature.
"See B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WIThOUT ZONING 77-84 (1972); Ellickson, Alternaiives to Zon-
ing: Covenants, Nuisance, Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CI. L. Rxv. 681,
713-19 (1973). The crucial importance of group size, and the sharply lesser likelihood of strategic
factors preventing joint pursuit of the convergent aims of members of small groups, are explored
at length in M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTIVE AcriON: (1965) [hereinafter cited as Olson].
Application of Olson's analysis to the problem of controlling land uses across a given area is
a bit complex but worth trying to work out. From an economic standpoint, the basic question to
be asked about any contemplated restriction, or scheme of restrictions, on uses which owners
within the area would otherwise be legally free to make of their respective parcels of land, is
whether the restriction or scheme would be efficient in the sense that the total of the private ex-
change values of the benefits it would bestow exceeds the total of the private exchange values of
the detriments it would impose. Only if the answer to that question is "yes" is there even the
possbiility of a problem of market failure which might be (partially) rectified by coercive, ma-
joritarian governmental action; and likewise, in terms of Olson's analysis, it is only if that answer
is "yes" that we can properly speak of the aggregation of owners within the area as constituting
(vis-a-vis the question of imposing the restrictive scheme) a "group"-"a number of individuals
with a common interest." (Id. at 8).
Their "common interest" of course, is just that of getting the efficient scheme imposed if
there is one. We have already (See notes 43-46, supra & text accompanying) noted some reasons
why strictly voluntary, private action, in the form of a multilateral market exchange transaction,
might fail to hit upon and impose an actually efficient restrictive scheme. Olson's thesis focuses
on the size of the group of owners in the area as an important factor affecting the probability of
such market failure, saying that the probability increases with increasing size of the group.
One of Olson's points is the simple and obvious one that the transaction costs of concluding a
voluntary arrangement will increase with increasing size of the group (see OLSON at 46, 48)-a
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this case for any regulatory intervention with its ever-attendant threat of
severe political externalities. The significance of the Richmond scheme's
decentralization feature, then, would be its implication that spillovers from
building set-back decisions are not believed to extend beyond a block or so,
making it feasible to hope for internalization through voluntary, consensual
dealings within a blockfront-sized group.7" This account ties in nicely with the
point having special significance (see id. at 42) in cases, such as those we are considering, where
lack of unanimous agreement will likely bmean no deal at all (because (a) just one parcel with
billboards can blight the whole block, and (b) the worst situation of all is to have had your land
restricted while some neighbor's is left unrestricted, and (c) the best situation of all is to own the
only unrestricted lot in the block).
But Olson's analysis takes us beyond this obvious point regarding transaction (organiza-
tional) costs to a quite distinct (though complementary) feature of group size-a feature most
easily perceived if we artificially divide the potential voluntary transaction into the two stages of
(i) identifying the several, and the total, private valuations of the costs (detriments) of a restrictve
scheme, and (ii) arranging for payment of those costs by those owners (or some of them) for
whom the private valuations of the scheme are positive. Stage (i)-securing complete and honest
reports from each owner in the area of how much monetary compensation (if any) will be needed
to prevent adoption of the scheme from injuring his or her net welfare position-obviously entails
transaction costs which will increase with the number of owners who must be heard from. But,
according to Olson's analysis, the likelihood of successful completion of stage (ii) depends on
group size for reasons in addition to transaction costs. Once the total compensation-payments bill
is known to all those owners who regard the scheme as beneficial, the group composed of those
beneficiary owners may be, in Olson's terminology, either a "privileged," or an "intermediate," or
a "latent" group. (See id. at 49-51.) The beneficiary group is privileged if at least one of its
members values the group's "collective good" (i.e., imposition of the restrictive scheme) so highly
as to find it worthwhile to pay all necessary compensation payments himself; the group is in-
termediate if it has no such member and also "does not have so many members that no one
member will notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the collective
good;" and it is latent if each of its members thinks that whether or not he or she contributes to
the effort to obtain the collective good (the restrictive scheme) is a circumstance that will make
no practical difference to the other members and so will go unnoticed by them. The crucial con-
ceptual distinction between intermediate and latent groups thus is one pertaining to incentives:
each member of a latent group has reason to think that the collective good is as likely to be
privided if she does not contribute as if she does, so there is an incentive for each to withhold
voluntary contribution. But each member of an intermediate group is in a position to see that
her failure to contribute may lead others to refuse, and so result in her not obtaining the desired
good; and so there is some incentive to contribute. Olson arrives at two related conclusions from
this analysis, which certainly are consistent with intuition: First: whether a group is privileged,
intermediate, or latent is likely to depend significantly on group size-with smaller groups being
more likely to br privileged and larger groups being more likely to be latent. Second, with a
privileged group there is a reasonable expectation that a collective good (such as an efficient
scheme of land use restrictions) will be privided by voluntary private transactions with no special
effort at group coordination or organization; with a latent group such a good will not be provid-
ed except through some coercive framework (such as a majoritarian legislature); and with an in-
termediate group the good may possibly (or may not) be provided without coercion, but some
special coordinating or organizational effort will be needed.
The upshot is that increasing size of a group of potentially affected landowners hurts the
group's chances of voluntarily (extra-governmenatlly) adopting an efficient scheme of land use
restrictions in two distinct though complementary ways: (1) the larger the group, the higher the
transaction (organizational) costs; and (2) the larger the whole group, the larger (probably) the
subgroup of potential beneficiaries, and, therefore, the less likely that subgroup is to fall within
the "privileged" or "intermediate" category.
78The argument is a normative twist on a positive hypothesis advanced in Posner II, supra
note 62, at 345; "[TJhe demand for regulation . . is greater among industries for which private
cartelization is an unfeasible or very costly alternative- industries that lack high concentration
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later decision in Gorieb v. Fox,79 upholding a city council's regulation of
building setbacks, fixed on a block-by-block basis, against substantive due
process attack and distingushing Eubank on the delegation point. In defen-
ding the ordinance the Court suggested a number of conceivable virtues of
block-long uniform building lines. Most of these were plainly of the sort that
are significant only within short range (roughly, a single block)-for example,
protecting each parcel from shadows cast by buildings on the others. But,
significantly, at least one of the Gorieb Codrt's justifying factors-the safety
hazard to traffic at corners where visibility is impared by curbside construc-
tion-is a spillover of at least citywide dimension. On the economic view we
are now developing, the difference between Gorieb and Eubank is just that in
the latter case the Richmond Council had excluded consideration of citywide
spillovers by decentralizing the decisions to blockfronts.
Now how well does all this work for Cusack, Roberge, Carter Coal? In
Roberge the Seattle Council's scheme would, by analogy with our treatment
of Eubank, imply its belief that spillovers from a rest-home subside into in-
significance beyond four hundred feet from the home. In a developed
residential area one might easily expect to find thirty or more homeowners
within a 400-foot radius of any point8 0- quite possibly in excess of the "small
and other characterisitics favorable to cartelization. They lack good substitutes for regulation."
Compare Buchanan, supra note 43, at 444-45.
Constrast the solution to the Eubank/Cusack puzzle offered by R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH
LAW 364 (1952) [hereinafter cited as HALE]:
(1) As noted by McBain, Law-Making by Property Owners, 36 POL. Se. Q. 617
(1921), the Cusack ordinance "could reasonably have been supported as a protection of
[neighborhood] property values;" and if so, provision for waiver of protection by the
(only) potentially affected property owners would have been "reasonable." [But see
note 117, infra and text accompaning.]
(2) "On the other hand, the justification for an ordinance which requires
buildings to conform to a street line may be thought to lie, not in the protection of the
value of property abutting the same street, but in the general convenience or beauty of
the city."
(3) But conditioning a land-use restriction on neighborhood action or waiver is
"reasonable" only if protection of interests contained within the neighborhood- and
not some citywide interest or "more general consideration" -is the justifiying aim of
the restriction.
(4) It follows from (1), (2), and (3) that the delegation feature was "reasonable"
in the signboard case but not in the building-line case; or, putting the same conclusion
somewhat differently, that inclusion of the delegation feature in the Eubank building-
line ordinance is consistent only with a view of that ordinance as aimed at protecting
neighborhood rather than citywide interests, and on that view of it the ordinance fails
the substantive due process test of relationship to a valid and significant societal in-
terest (because, according to (2), "the justification" for such an ordinance is "thought
to lie [only] in the general convenience or beauty of the city.
But this attempt to reconcile Eubank and Cusack seems fatally flawed by the arbitrariness of
(2)-of "thinking" that only citywide interests, not localized neighborhood concerns (as reflected
in "property values"), can rationally justify a builiding-line ordinance. Armchair reflection seems
sufficient to banish any such "thought." If authority also is required, see the Supreme Court's opi-
nion in the Gorieb case, discussed in text immediately following.
79274 U.S. 603 (1928).
10A circle with a radius of 400 ft. has an area of (400)2 7r = 507,456 sq. ft. A quarter-acre
building lot has an area of about 11,000 sq. ft.
[Vol. 53:145
COMPETITING JUDICIAL MODELS
number" of bargainers for whom strategic transaction costs are expected to
remain tolerable."' On the other hand, the Court's description of the case
suggests that the number actually involved there may have been much
smaller.' 2 Perhaps an efficient legal system would forbear from such a
"microscopic"'' 3 examination of the facts of particular cases. If so, then
Roberge could be viewed as consistent with Eubank in terms of an
economically justifiable general rule rejecting land-use regulation schemes
which are decentralized to the "neighborhood" scale, because of the general
likelihood that at that scale the market externalities arising from bargaining
strategy are unlikely to exceed the political externalities associated with col-
lective decision. 84 Carter Coal is just a bit harder to deal with. On the surface
it would seem that the numbers of individual producer firms and miners, the
units which would have been organized into majority-rule regimes by the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, was very large indeed. The
Court's recital of the facts does not, however, reveal the extent to which these
individual agents might have already organized themselves into voluntary
associations for purposes of negotiating labor agreements, and it is con-
ceivable that the number of economically operative units had (as the Court
somehow knew, but did not say) by such means been reduced to a small
enough number that no further governmental intervention was needed to
overcome the transaction costs of voluntary bargaining. Of course just sug-
gesting this possibility discloses a broader and plainly more powerful
economic interpretation of the Carter Coal delegation holding: If such
collective-bargaining units had in fact been organized on either side, they
would have been regarded by economists not as the benign outcome of volun-
tary transactions overcoming externalities and thereby achieving efficiency,
but rather as economically damaging, anti-competitive, combinations in
restraint of trade which obstructed the march towards efficiency. 8 The only
externalities that would be overcome by such associations, whether voluntarily
organized or imposed by the government, would be the merely "pecuniary"
ones arising out of competition; and those externalities, not being regarded as
economically evil or inefficient, would have provided no justification for the
imposition of the political-externality costs implicit in majoritarian formula-
tion of a Coal Code.
But whatever may be said about Roberge and Carter Coal, the proposed
economic rationale for the Eubank decision will not suffice to explain the
I'See note 77 supra.
"See note 70 supra.
"Compare Posner, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contratct Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
83, 103 (1977). [hereinafter cited as Posner III].
"On the economic arguments favoring use of rules of thumb over particularistic applica-
tion of broad standards, see id. at 95-96, 114; Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
"
5 See, e.g., EcONOMic ANALYSiS supra note 2, at 239-41, 501.
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Cusack case. If block-sized groups are not too large to deal economically6
with building setback spillovers, neither are they too large to deal
economically with billboard spillovers. The proposed theory seems to suggest,
then, that the Chicago billboard ordinance should have been struck down
because its block-by-block decentralization feature implied that billboard
spillovers are block-sized in scale, and so could have been most economically
handled by the unregulated market.
Economically inspired, public-choice thinking, however, offers another
way to get at Cusack-one which has the happy virtue of giving some more-
than-formalistic point to the Court's insistence that the Chicago scheme mere-
ly gave the neighbors the power to lift a restriction imposed by the Council,
this being viewed as somehow different from giving them the power to impose
their own restriction. Suppose the Chicago council had just flatly ruled
billboards out of predominantly residential blocks. Normative public-choice
theorists could argue that the billboard interests would have had no valid
complaint, because this outcome would just have been one of a series over
which they, presumably, like other interests, could expect to derive a net
benefit from coordination which only government could achieve at a feasible
transaction cost.87 While the particular outcome (billboard exclusion from
residential areas) is deterimental to them, other outcomes of the same
legislative process presumably have been or will be beneficial. And this rela-
tionship of reciprocity is not supposed to be accidental. The billboard in-
terests in Cusack, almost certainly a self-conscious and very possibly a formal-
ly organized interest-group, would have had a fair chance to fight their bat-
tle, to protect their interest, to engage effectively in political horsetrade, at
the city council level. They in fact may have exacted some concessions respec-
ting other legislative concerns of theirs during the process of building a
legislative majority to enact the challenged ordinance. It may, indeed, seem
especially plausible to think of them as having thus "given in" (for a price) to
the ordinance, since it leaves them with at least a hope of prevailing in par-
ticular situations by obtaining neighborhood consents. But be that last point
as it may, since the billboard interests cannot (in this public-choice vision)
complain about a flatly prohibitory ordinance, they a fortiori can not com-
plain about the one that gives them an escape hatch.
A comparison of the political opportunities available to the interests
which turn out to be harmed in Eubank is instructive. For them, no com-
parable log-rolling opportunity ever seems to have existed. At least it is hard
to imagine an anti-setback lobby mobilizing to oppose the Richmond or-
dinance in the City Council or exact concessions in respect of its enactment.88
8 That is, with tolerable transaction costs. See note 77 supra & text accompanying.
7See notes 43, 44 supra & text accompanying.
8 There may, of course, have been a self-conscious-even an orgainzed-homebuilder or
developer (vacant land owner) interest. But participants in such an interest could normally an-
ticipate sharing in the benefits as well as in the burdens to be generated by the blockfront actions
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The only trenchant legislative decision was made at the blockfront level,
where no space or opportunity for political trade ever existed. The blockfront
group was not a polity possessed of any breadth of substantive competence or
even continuity of organized existence. The Madisonian or Dahlian vision of
coalitions that form and re-form from issue to issue, of legislators exchanging
support here for support there in an ever-shifting alignment of interest
groups, making plausible an expectation that over the long run everyone
would enjoy a net balance of political gains in excess of losses, had neither
substantive nor temporal scope in which to operate. In the Eubank blockfront
there would be one group of winners, one group of losers, on one, single,
nakedly redistributive occasion. s9
So the effort to find an economic rationale for the Cusack decision sug-
gests that a crucial element, in the market-failure version of the normative
economic theory of how majoritarian government can serve everyone's in-
dividual long-run interest, is the theory of coalitions, of log-rolling, of
"minorities rule" in Robert Dahl's arresting phrase. 90 Without that theory
there can be no credible assurance that each individual will, over the long
run, derive net advantage to his or her own, private interests from the ma-
joritarian welfare state.
Having seen how log-rolling theory can thus provide an economic ra-
tionale for the seemingly opposed resvlts in the Eubank and Cusack cases, it
is necessary to consider how well that same rationale might also handle the
decisions in Roberge and Carter Coal. As for Roberge, the answer is not very
well at all. The objectionable regulatory scheme in Roberge arose out of two,
successive, actions by the Seattle Council. The first action was adoption of a
comprehensive zoning scheme in which rest homes were omitted from the list
made possible by the Richmond ordinance: They would own (or be building on) some parcels
whose amenity value would be increased by more than their development value would be reduced
by the various blockfront actions, as well as some parcels for which the balance would be the
reverse. A priori, then, the enabling ordinance may for them have been no more a threat than
an opportunity. By contrast, the Chicago billboard ordinance could work only to the disadvan-
tage of firms in the outdoor advertising business: first, by destroying the value of outstanding
leases (or negotiations for leases) in residential areas; second, by drastically reducing the supply
of legally available billboard sites and thus driving up the price (in the forms both of rentals to
owners and of "bribes" to neighbors in return for their consents); third, by reducing the total
number of useable advertising locations available at feasible cost, and thereby reducing the total
demand for billboard-related services such as site acquisition, construction, artwork, production,
posting.
891t is true, of course, that some blockfront owners might have been compensated by others
(with, e.g., money) for agreeing to vote in favor of the building line despite its injurious impact
on their interests. But since a unanimous vote was not required, there would very likely be at
least a few uncompensated, injured owners. See generally W. RiKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
COALITIONS (1962).
9 R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). See also D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERN-
MENTAL PROCESS (1958); A. BENTLEY. THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1949); W. BAUMOL.
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 45 (2d ed. 1965); E. HAFELE, REPRESEN-
TATIvE GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1973). The group-interest theory sup-
ported by Truman and Bentley, supra, is critically reviewed in OLSON. supra note 76, at 117-31.
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of uses allowed in first residence districts. It obviously would be stretching a
point too far to deny that the pendency of a comprehensive zoning bill before
a city council affords a perfectly adequate-not to say an unusually fine-op-
portunity for all interests whose land-use activities would suffer restriction
under the bill to defend themselves through normally available log-rolling
channels.91 At any rate, one could hardly make that denial and still have
much of any governmental regulatory competence left, and of course, one
could not make it at all without (in our proposed economic frame of
reference) outright rejection of the 1926 decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. 92 The second action consisted of an amendment allowing rest homes in
first residence districts if, but only if, the requisite consents were obtained
from neighboring owners. From the standpoint of log-rolling theory, the total
effect looks similar to, though possibly less obviously justifiable than that of,
the Chicago City Council's action upheld in Cusack.9 3
Application of the log-rolling theory to Carter Coal yields a more am-
biguous result. On the one hand, Carter Coal seems to resemble Eubank in
that in neither case were well-defined, interest-oriented decisions made by the
constitutionally recognized legislative body (Congress or the Richmond City
Council). In both cases the delegation was so vague or open that no one
could really tell how he stood to gain or lose until specific proposals took
shape in the irregular forum to which authority had been delegated, so that
only in that forum could there have been any possibility of joint optimization
through trade. On the other hand, Carter Coal seems to differ sharply from
Eubank when attention is shifted to the make-up of the irregular forum's
agenda. In Eubank that agenda was utterly flat and simple: one unidimen-
sional issue, one resolution. By contrast, the agenda laid before the coal pro-
ducers and miners by the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935-for-
mulation of codes to govern production, employment, and marketing in the
nation's coal industry-was, one would think, bursting with potential issues
that could cleave the participants along many different axes into many cross-
cutting proto-coalitions. Certainly one cannot conclude without closer in-
vestigation that there was no genuine possibility there of joint optimization
through vote-trading. 94 Carter Coal, then, can perhaps be fitted with the log-
rolling theory, but only by making a superficially dubious assumption about
unexplored facts.
91See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
'.ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1218, 1223 (1967).
91272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding comprehensive zoning ordinance against substantive due
process attack).
"As compared with the Chicago outdoor-advertising industry, sponsors of "philanthropic
homes for children or old people" in Seattle may seem less certain to have been an organized or
organizeable interest group capable of effective lobbying at the city-council level.
"
4 Optimization, that is, from the standpoint of the participants. We have already seen that
from a more inclusive, societal standpoint, the anticompetitive outcome of the code-making pro-
cess could not be expected to be optimizing, see note 85 supra and text accompanying.
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Pausing now to review, we have identified two distinct normative
economic sub-theories of delegation: the small-numbers/low-transaction-costs
sub-theory (henceforward the "small numbers theory") 95 and the log-
rolling/thin-agenda ("log-rolling") sub-theory. 6 The small numbers theory
adequately handles Eubank and Roberge, and covers Carter Coal by exten-
sion'7 but fails to explain Cusack. The log-rolling theory adequately handles
Eubank and Cusack, covers Carter Coal only if stretched, and may fail to ex-
plain Roberge.91 The obvious next move is to cumulate the two sub-theories.
A normative economic account of government will then be seen to offer two
separate reasons for invalidating certain legislative delegations: (i) that the
group to which the delegation is made is so small as to contradict there being
an economic justification for any collective decision at all, and (ii) that the
delegation prevents the crystallization of issues, in an interest-oriented form,
in any forum whose agenda is fat enough to accommodate joint optimization
by log-rolling. It can then be said the the Eubank delegation was bad on
both grounds, the Roberge delegation was bad on first ground, the Carter
delegation was questionable (or worse) on both grounds and so certainly bad
when the doubts are cumulated.
But Cusack, alas, remains a problem. Cusack looks like the same case as
Roberge: a delegation bad on small-numbers grounds but not on log-rolling
grounds. If either ground alone is supposed to be sufficient for condemning a
delegation, then Roberge stands explained but Cusack does not; and if both
together are supposed to be necessary for invalidity, then Cusack stands ex-
plained but Roberge does not. The only way finally to square all four cases is
to show that, in normative economic thinking, the small-numbers objection
should recede before an unusually strong showing of log-rolling opportunity
in a constitutionally recognized legislative body. To any reader who has been
willing to follow the economic tour de force this far, it will come as no sur-
prise to be told that this, too, can be done-if with some effort.
As a prelude for this last triumphant step, it is necessary to shift attention
momentarily back to the public purpose doctrine. It can now be seen that as
between strictly procedural review (tantamount to a rejection of any
justiciable, substantive public-purpose limitation)9 and rational-basis review,
only the former and not the latter truly fits the market-failure version of the
economic theory of government-just as only the former fits the big-bribe
version. 00 For in recognizing the crucial significance of log-rolling, one sees
that the market-failure account depends not only on a conception of self-
interested legislative traders-or of legislative traders self-interestedly respon-
sive to self-interested constituents-but also on a conception of legislative out-
95See notes 75-86 supra & text accompanying.
"See notes 87-94 supra & text accompanying.917See note 85 supra & text accompanying.
IsSee notes 91-94 supra & text accompanying.
19See note 56 supra & text accompanying.
'
00See note 57 supra & text accompanying.
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put as not a series of discrete, separately intelligible and appraisable enact-
ments, but rather a continuous unitary network of compromise-of implicit
multilateral trade so complex as to be almost certainly opaque and in-
decipherable to any outside observer. 101
The log-rolling element in the normative public-choice argument implies
the indissoluble interconnectedness of all the moments of legislative activity,
depriving an observer of all ability to individuate or isolate legislative acts for
purposes of rational-basis appraisal. There just is no saying where one
legislative transaction ends and another begins, if everything the legislature
does is integrated into an endless, unfathomable process of implicit bargain
and compromise. Since it is just that process over time, and no particular
moment inside the process, that is supposed to redound to everyone's net
private advantage, only the integrity of the process and not the virtue of the
moments can ever be open to external-that is, judicial-appraisal.1 0 2
A crude-but not, alas, quite fanciful-analogy should serve to drive the
point home. Assume P, an individual, methodically ploughing under crops
growing on his farm. Any objection that Ps behavior is wasteful is plainly
ruled out by the subjectivist, individualist tenets of economics (once granted
that those really are P's land and P's crops). One might want to say that PIs
behavior discloses his insanity, so as to vitiate any ethical claim exerted by his
subjectivity and justify restraining him; but caution is in order because one
might, if one troubled to ask, discover that P was destroying his crops in
return for a large monetary payment from Q. That news should end our
suspicion of P's mental health. It might at the same time raise a concern
about Q, but she probably has an equally sane-though possibly idiosyn-
'O'Compare Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, (1973); J. COMMONS. LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 7-9 (1924).
"
02This is the conclusive reason why it would be fantastic to think (see note 58 supra) that
courts engaged in rational-basis review are responding to perceptions or intuitions of occasional
political failure or misfire. In order to work at all as an economic rationale of the welfare
state-in order to compete effectively in that role with the "big bribe" conception, as it in-
contestably has in the modem history of American political thought, see, e.g., notes 45, 90
supra-the "market failure" conception must commit itself to the claim that the self-interest
motivated, majoritarian legislative process has an economizing tendency over much or most of its
constutional range. The most that can be yielded to the skeptical wing of the literature, see note
48 supra, is that the process doesn't work perfectly, that sometimes it breaks down or fouls up.
But given also the interconnectedness (discussed in the text) of all legislative episodes, no one can
possibly claim to know just where in the stream of legislative output the breakdowns have occur-
red.
Of course it remains quite possible to think of judges identifying occasions when legislative
measures impair interests to which such an extraordinarily high value is conventionally assigned
that measures impairing those interests are presumptively inefficient; and one might include, in
the explanation of why judges on such occasions intervene relatively unrestrainedly, the thought
that judges can in such cases reasonably suspect that the political process must have been visited
with "failure" (else it wouldn't-couldn't-have committed this enormity). But here we have hit
upon a version of the economic theory of civil liberties and the Bill of Rights, see, e.g.,
BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 45, at 73-74; compare J. RAwLs. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 205-21
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Rawls], and have left the domain of the "public purpose" doctrine.
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cratic-explanantion for her conduct, which could conceivably involve some
sort of exchange offer from R. And so on. In the normative public choice
model of legislation, there is never any way of ruling out the possibility of a
network of obscure exchanges that would explain, if one could only see it, the
rationality of all votes cast in favor of ostensibly crazy measures.
And there (Eurekal) we have the reason why, in a case like Cusack, a pa-
tent small-numbers objection to the economic rationality of the decentraliza-
tion scheme must be disregarded as long as the scheme can be seen to have
originated in a duly constituted legislative process in which there was the
clearest of opportunities for log-rolling by or on behalf of a well-defined,
"vested" interest (i.e., the billboard industry) which stood to be directly
harmed by the very enactment establishing the decentralization. The final
result is that by use of normative economic thinking these four delegation
cases can be reconciled, but only by a move that also overthrows a well-
entrenched body of doctrine in the not-so-remote area of public purpose. No
matter how one works this economic shell game, one cannot cover all the
peas.
In a normative economic framework, then, it looks like good-bye to
rational-basis review under the banner of public purpose-or, for that mat-
ter, of general welfare or due process or equal protection. Yet under those
banners state judges, at least, do continue to invalidate ordinances and
statutes on grounds of substantive irrationality or like inadequacy, and judges
state and federal continue to intone the rational-basis litany. 0 3 If it is true
that even such restrained substantive judicial review is at odds with the sub-
jectivist, individualist, normative economic account of the majoritarian
welfare state, then that account cannot be said to have undisputed possession
of the judicial imagination in the realm of public law adjudication. Some
other conception also must be exerting influence there.
III. PUBLIC INTEREST THINKING IN PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
Having considered some judicial applications of the public purpose and
delegation doctrines in light of the public choice model, one ought now to
consider these docrines in light of the public interest model. Again beginning
with the public purpose doctrine, the hypothesis now to be explored is that
substantive judicial review under the aegis of public purpose, which impres-
sionistically seems a far more common judicial stance than merely procedural
review of legislative expenditure dicisions, is consistent with an imputation to
'
03See, e.g., in addition to cases cited at nn. 53-55 supra, United States Brewers' Ass'n v.
State, 220 N.W. 2d 544, 192 Neb. 328 (1974) (invalidating statutory protections for alcoholic
beverage distributorships because "the exercise of the police power must be directed toward and
have a rational relation to the best interests of society rather than the mere advantage of par-
ticular individuals"). See generally Note, Counterrevolution in State Constitutional Law, 15
STAN. L. REv. 309 (1963); Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substative Due Process
of Law, 53 Nw. L. REV. 226 (1958).
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judges of a public-interest type, but not a public-choice (economic) type, of
normative model of government.10 4 In a normative economic framework
substantive review founders on subjectivism: the court confronts an
unanalyzable, continuously emergent network of bargains-all of them
presumptively rational in the eyes of those who actually make them- among
kaleidoscopically shifting coalitions of self interest. But in a public-interest
framework, in which measures are supposed to result from a joint legislative
search for the right or best answer, nothing logically prevents a court from
concluding that the legislature's search must just have gone off the tracks in a
particular case. 05
Of course the judges would not have available any tightly structured logic
or formula for deducing when a legislature has switched out of the ideal role.
They would have to consult their own educated understanding of the values
broadly shared in their society 08 - including the rate and direction of evolu-
tion of values 0 7- in order to make judgments about whether given legislative
products fairly reflect an effort to realize those values or their trajectories.
Sometimes judges would, of necessity, be remitted to "hunches" 108 -just as
courts supposedly striving to make the common law efficient must sometimes
fall back on huriches about such esoteric questions as that of how to adjust
the legal relations of tulip gardeners and pea bird ranchers, when their ac-
tivities are mutually interfering, so as to maximize the social value (in the
economic sense of aggregated individual valuations) of the resultant product
mix of tulips and pea birds.109
"'But the exceedingly loose review in federal courts may reflect the influence of an
economic model. See note 52 supra.
'I5 ndeed, the positive economic theory of legislation-as distinguished from the normative
economic theory embedded in the public-choice model-predicts that humanly frail legislators
will tend to stray from their ideal role, at least unless some external, discipline like substantive
judicial review is imposed. See, e.g., G. STIGLER. THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: 114-41 (1975);
POSNER II, supra note 62; notes 228-30, infra & text accompanying.
Loose substantive review can be construed as both a recognition that legislators playing their
ideal role re generally better situated than are judges for reasoning towards right solutions to
social problems, and at the same time a device for prompting the legislators to act in that ideal
role. Compare the role assigned to civil disobedience in RAWLS. supra note 102, at 364-68,
382-86.
'No doubt closely consulting institutional history, as does Hercules in Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1057 (1975).
'See Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. Civ. RTs. Civ. LiB. L. REV. 269, 291-303,
314-21 (1975).
"Compare POSNER III, supra note 83, at 118.
0'0 See Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. LAW. & ECON. 201,
209-11 (1971). Compare Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 787-88, 104 N.W. 2d 227,
234 (1960) where, in the course of invalidating a statutory regulation of milk marketing prac-
tices, the court said: "Courts are not powerless to determine the character of... legislation. The
construction of statutes and the determination of their reasonableness is the ultimate province,
responsibility, and duty of the courts and must be exercised by them if state and federal guaran-
ties of liberty and property rights are not to be made subservient to pressure groups which seek
and frequently secure the enactment of statutes advantageous to a particular industry and
detrimental to another under the guise of police power regulations."
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What happens if we try to use public-interest thinking to solve the puzzl-
ing batch of delegation cases?1 One conceivable approach is to differentiate
the public-choice and public-interest models with respect to what role they
assign to the legislature in the recognition, creation, and protection of rights.
In the economically inspired public-choice model, the legislative process is
seen as designed to reveal what legal rights it would be expedient to create
for various classes of people."' In a public-interest conception, by contrast,
the legislature's job is that of discerning what rights various classes of people
as a matter of fact have, irrespective of the legislature's actual success in ac-
curately discerning them, and of providing suitable forms of protection for
those rights.'1 2 Cusack (the Chicago billboard case) would then reflect judicial
satisfaction that the city legislature did its job correctly by concluding and
declaring that property owners in established residential neighborhoods have
rights not to be intruded upon by "offensive" structures like billboards, at the
same time recognizing that there is no objection to letting people waive their
rights; while in Eubank (the Richmond building-line case) the city legislature
could be said to have failed in its responsibility to decide whether owners
along a block have rights not to be disturbed by their neighbors' nonuniform
setbacks or thin front yards, and in Roberge (the Seattle rest home case) the
city legislature could be said either to have made no determination whether
the residential owners have a right against entry of rest homes into their
neighborhood or, if they did make such a determination, to have made it
wrongly. This interpretation accounts for what earlier seemed to be surplus
rhetoric in the Roberge opinion." 3 It also fits well with the decision in Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., "1 ten years after Cusack and two years before
Roberge, in which the Court's validation of a city regulation excluding apart-
ment houses from single-family residence areas rested heavily on the idea that
apartments would be noxious intruders in such areas (like "pigs in
parlors")," s so that the city legislation could be seen as simply recognizing a
"0See notes 63-71 supra text accompanying.
"'The economic problem is to devise that system of pre-exchange rights (legally enforceable
claims) which will minimize the sum of (i) deadweight losses (misallocations) remaining after
completion of all economically feasible exchange, and (ii) the costs of such exchnge itself. For
some elaboration, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972): Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property
Rights, 9 J. L. & EcON. 61, 64-67 (1966); EcONoMic ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 36-38, 44-48.
Some versions of the normative economic theory of government seem to proceed from a set of ax-
iomatic, pre-political ("natural") rights-physical security of the person, for example, or property
rights in the products of one's labor. But insofar as they do, they are hybrid theories-economic
superstructures on noneconomic (objectivist) foundations.
"'It will be noted that I am using "public interest" here to denote any conception in which
the government's role is to identify and/or realize ends or values regarded as objective for the
society-not just non-individualist ends or values like national power or cultural eminence; so
there is nothing odd about describing the legislature's job in such a conception as that of identi-
fying and protecting the objective rights of individuals.
'sSee note 71 supra & text accompanying.
1"Note 92 supra.
"'1272 U.S. at 388.
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true right of the residential owners already implicit in the ancient common
law doctrine of nuisance. The account can even handle the 1927 decision in
Gorieb v. Fox, 1 6 one year after Euclid and one before Roberge, upholding a
city ordinance establishing building setback lines on a block-by-block basis,
relying on Euclid and distinguishing Eubank by reference to the delegation
feature of the latter case. In Gorieb the city legislature could be said to have
done the job that no legislature did in Eubank, that of determining (correct-
ly, the Court must have thought) that building on one's property too close to
the street is a violation of the property rights of one's neighbors.
There are, however, serious problems with this true rights-false
rights-no rights account of the cases. One is that it does not explain why the
Eubank blockfront cannot itself be treated as legislature determining the ex-
istence of a sort of right apparently endorsed by the Court in Gorieb.
Another is that it does not explain why the Richmond City Council's action in
Eubank (or the Seattle Council's in Roberge) cannot be treated as analogous
to the Chicago Council's in Cusack-that is, as a determination that people
do have rights not to be disturbed by neighbors building too close to the
street (or neighbors introducing rest homes into a residential neighborhood)
but are free to waive those rights (in Eubank, by just never asserting them). A
still more serious problem is that the Chicago ordinance was in fact not a
device for allowing a property owner to waive his right not to have a
billboard enter his neighborhood, but rather one for empowering his
neighbors to waive his supposed right against his will;1 17 and it seems very
odd to think of the Supreme Court in 1916 as recognizing a collective, but
not an individual, right against intrusion by billboards." 8
All in all, we can conclude that if public-interest thinking has some way
of explaining the delegation cases, it must be a different and better way than
the rights-focused approach. An important clue to a possible better way is
provided by an important new chapter in the delegation saga, not yet discuss-
ed.
Two terms ago, in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,119 the Supreme
Court revisited the problem of the Eubank, Cusack, and Roberge cases in a
slightly altered context. The voters of the city of Eastlake, Ohio, had amend-
ed their city charter, as authorized by the Ohio Constitution, to stipulate that
any zoning changes agreed to by the City Council must be ratified by a 55%
116Note 79 supra.
17That is, a majority of the owners in the block could grant a waiver.
1"It is true that the plaintiff in Cusack was a would-be sign builder, not a non-consenting
neighbor, but that point seems insufficient to handle the objection. The restraint on the sign
builder is supposed, in our tentative public-interest theory, to be justified by the fact (which the
Council's ordinance is merely supposed to recognize) that his neighbors have rights against his
building the sign. But the idea that the Council's ordinance means to recognize such rights is
contradicted by its provision allowing entry of the sign with less than unanimous consent-thus
undermining the supposed justification for restricting the sign builder's freedom in the first place.
1-9426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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vote in a referendum before they could take effect. The plaintiff, a lan-
downer who had obtained both Planning Commission and City Council ap-
proval for a zoning reclassification to permit construction of an apartment
building but apparently lacked confidence in the outcome of a referendum,
challenged the referendum requirement as a violation of due process rights.
The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed, citing the Eubank case and calling the
procedure an "unlawful delegation of legislative power."120 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.
The Court first denied that the referendum could properly be
characterized as a legislative "delegation" at all, considering that siate
legislatures are supposed in the first place to derive their powers from the
people, who can always-as had the people of Ohio in their constitu-
tion-reserve some of the law-making power to themselves (or to municipal
electorates) by devices such as the referendum. But as the Court seemed to
recognize,12' that analysis showed only that the Eastlake referendum pro-
cedure did not violate any procedural mandate of Ohio Constitution. It did
not answer the general procedural due process complaint that the plaintiff's
right to use his property had been left dependent upon (as the Ohio Supreme
Court put it) "the potentially arbitrary and unreasonable whims of the voting
public,"'2-which, of course, is just where Eubank comes in.
The Court answered the due process claim by observing that judicial
relief would always be available if the voters' action could be shown to have
been substantively unreasonable; by recalling that the requirement of "discer-
nible standards" to control legislative delegations to administrative bodies had
never been applied where power was reserved to "the people themselves;"12 3
by noting that there is no better assurance that a representative legislature
"will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is with
respect to voters;"1 24 and-without yet having said anything which could
distinguish Eubank-by simply concluding that there is nothing constitu-
tionally objectionable about a standardless referendum procedure for making
land-use decisions. Eubank was then, at last, distinguished on the ground
that in that case the legislative body (presumably the Court was thinking of
the Richmond City Council) had delegated its authority "to a narrow segment
of the community not to the people at large." 2"5 "The standardless delegation
of power to a limited group ... condemned . . .in Eubank," said the Court,
"is not to be equated with decisionmaking by the people through the referen-
dum process."" 26 Roberge was distinguished in the same way. Borrowing from
1"'41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 198, 324 N.E.2d 740, 747 (1975).
"'426 U.S. at 675.
12141 Ohio St. 2d at 194, 324 N.E.2d at 746.
123426 U.S. at 675.
121Id. at 675-76 n. 10.
"
51d. at 677 (Court's emphasis).
126Id. at 678 (emphasis supplied).
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a Ninth Circuit opinion, the Court added the thought that "a referendum...
is far more than an expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood
preference. It is the city itself legislating through its voters-an exercise by
the voters of their traditional right .. . to [determine] .. .what serves the
public interest. 15 27 That last quotation, with its derogation of mere
neighborhood "preference," in favor of something called a "public interest"
found by something called "the city itself," should certainly suggest that the
Court was not in direct touch with the divinities of economics and public
choice while ruminating on the Eastlake case. And analysis will shortly con-
firm what the Court's rhetoric suggests.
The public-choice argument against the legitimacy of the popular-
decision process in Eubank and Roberge applies with undiminished force to
Eastlake. Just as the property owner in Eubank suffered a definite loss in a
one-time-only, substantively and temporally restricted forum providing no
scope for politcal compensation through vote trading (or even for build-up of
moral obligaiton to be politically cashed in the future) so it was with the
Eastlake plaintiff. Of course it is not literally true of the Eastlake electorate,
as of the Richmond blockfront, that it will never again act as a body, or
possibly even be in a position to do something nice for Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc. But you obviously cannot dicker with a citywide electorate for
support now in exchange for your support on something else later; the coali-
tion process does not work in the unwieldy and irregular referendum forum;
one just wins or loses and that is all. The transactional assurance-the
assurance from log-rolling-of broadly distributed long-run net benefits from
public action is suspended equally in both the cases. 128 Nor will the public-
choice analyst get any comfort from the Court's characterization of the
Eubank blockfront as a "narrow segment" or "limited group," as contrasted
with the wholesome inclusiveness of the Eastlake electorate. The Eubank
blockfront was no narrower or more limited than the scope of the impact of
the issue presented to it. Why else would "narrowness" of the decision group
be a concern? In an economic, public-choice framework that query seems
unanswerable. 129
A thesis of this essay, of course, is that the Eastlake decision exemplifies
the salience in the judicial mentality of what I have called the public-interest,
1271d., quoting from Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union,
424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970) (emphasis supplied).
'21See Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of
Referendum Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. Rav. 753, 768-69 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wolfinger &
Greenstein].
129A conceivable answer is that "narrowness" refers to an affected group's being so small (in
absolute numbers) as to suggest that a voluntary, unanimous settlement could be achieved at
tolerable transaction costs without any governmental intervention. See notes 76-78 supra & text
accompanying. But our prior discussion suggests that a serious log-rolling defect should be suffi-
cient, in the economic conception, to condemn a delegation even in the absence of a small-
numbers objection. And in the sense relevant to the log-rolling dimension, the Eastlake electorate
was a "narrow" forum, with a thin agenda.
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as opposed to the economic or public-choice, model of legislation. For that
thesis, a testing question is whether public-interest thinking can illuminate
not only the Eastlake result but the Eastlake Court's treatment of Eubank (as
well as Roberge and Cusack), as public-choice thinking cannot.
In addressing that question, it is necessary to refer to the discussion in
Part 1130 of the idea that one can be an individualist in ethics-can, that is,
take it as a premise that what ultimately counts in life is the experience of in-
dividuals-and yet maintain that an adequate conception of individual
freedom depends on a view of at least some values as objective not subjective;
and to the suggestion there that freedom for individuals depends upon the
possibility of objective ends or values to which one can commit oneself on
principle; that for individuals in secular society such ends or values will en-
compass matters of interpersonal relationship, obligation and respect and, for
the freedom-seeking socialized individual, political process will be both a
medium for reasoning towards ends (and acting towards their attainment)
and, at the same time, itself one of the ends.
In such a public-interest conception (or community self-determination
conception) of politics, there is nothing crucially objectionable about letting
decisions be made by a process such as a referendum vote offering no oppor-
tunity for vote-trading, because the object of the process is supposed to be
communal definition of aims. That point will suffice to explain the Eastlake
result in terms of a public-interest model, but more is needed to explain the
Eastlake opinion's treatment of Eubank. For if politics is a medium for joint
definition of aims, why not also joint definition by the Eubank group of
blockfront neighbors? One possible answer may come from Rousseau, begin-
ning with his insistence that the definition of aims through politics is an
ethical process, 13 and one which treats the individual as the ultimate object
of ethical concern.1 3 2 Such insistence means that when individuals act
politically, when they act as citizens, they are to act on behalf of and with
regard to one another, as well as themselves, as persons worthy of a full and
equal measure of respect.1 33 In Rousseau's no doubt romantic and arguably
totalitarian vision, the requisite motivations of sympathy, respect, and respon-
sibility were to be instilled in part through an elaborate education pro-
15tSee notes 25-30 supra & text accompanying.
1"See, e.g, J.-J. RoussEAu, supra note 24, at 15 ("act of association creates a moral and col-
lective body"). See also CASsIRER, THE QUESTION OF JEAN-JAcQuEs ROUSSEAU, supra note 28, at
65-66; note 28 supra, passim.
"'sSee, e.g., J.-J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 24, at 13-14 (problem is "to find a form of associa-
tion which will defend and protect ... the person and goods of each associate"); id. at 15 (social
compact provides for "'receiv[ing] each member as an indivisible part of the whole"') (emphasis
in original).
"
5 See, e.g., id. at 10; id. at 29 ("undertakings which bind us to the social body are
obligatory only because they are mutual"); id. at 30 ("every authentic act of the general will
binds or favors all the citizens equally"). This is the condition on which the acts of a popular
sovereign are truly acts of self-government and, accordingly, realizations of moral freedom. See
Levine, supra note 20, at 39, 40, 43. See also note 138, infra.
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gram.134 But they would have to depend further on a strong and clear dif-
ferentiation of the special role one plays as citizen from one's normal, every-
day pursuits as private individual and, relatedly, on a careful construction of
special formal or ceremonial contexts designed to place the individual in the
special citizen's role-to force that role on the individual by cultural
means-on those special occasions when political as distinguished from nor-
mally self-regarding private action is in progress. 35
An appreciation of this motivational importance of context and role
could go far towards explaining what the Supreme Court might have meant
by dismissing the Eubank blockfront as a "narrow segment" and a "limited
group" to be distinguished from "the people" or "the city;" and also what the
Court could have meant in the Carter Coal case when it objected that the
majority of coal producers and miners would not be acting "in an official
capacity, presumptively disinterested"- all of it rhetoric which makes no sense
in an economic, public-choice model of legislation. 3 6 The Court's true mean-
ing, I suggest, is that when you ask an immediately interested person to cast a
vote in a one-time blockfront decision about a building setback, or in a one-
time industry decision about a labor code, you just cannot expect that person
to switch into his or her special citizen's motivational mode of sympathy and
responsibility for all equally. A strong enough signal has not been sent or a
sufficiently powerful cultural constraint invoked to do such heavy motiva-
tional work. The Court thinks it is a different case, however, when a person is
11
4See id. at 139-40 (discussing the "civil religion"). But my text fails to convey the subtlety
and richness of Rousseau's views on education. See CASSIRER. supra note 28, at 120-27.
"'That Rousseau had no thought-and no wish-that the private sphere of life should
disappear or dissolve into the "general will" is evident throughout THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. See
LEVINE, supra note 20, at 57-58, 74-76, 196-97. For evidence of the significance he attached to
formal or ceremonial context see, e.g., J.-J. RoussEAu. supra note 24, at 90, 92, 100, 103-04
("apart from [his particular] good, [each man] wills the general good in his own interest ....
Even in selling his vote for money, he does not extinguish in himself the general will, but only
eludes it. The fault he commits is that of changing the state of the question, and answering
something different from what he is asked. Instead of saying, by his vote, 'It is to the advantage
of the State,' he says, 'It is of advantage to this or that man or party that this or that view should
prevail.' Thus the law of public order in assemblies is not so much to maintain in them the
general will as to secure that the question be always put to it, and the answer always given by
it.") (emphasis supplied); id. at 106 ("when in the populr assembly a law is proposed, what the
people is asked is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in con-
formity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion
on that point; and the general will is found by counting votes.") (emphasis supplied). Chapter IV
of Book IV of THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, id. at 110-21, describing forms of political organization
and procedure in republican Rome, is evidently aimed in part at showing how such factors can
be used to frame occasions for eliciting expressions of the general will rather than of particular
wills. See especially id. at 119-20, discussing use of what we moderns call a roll-call vote. For a
contemporary echo and a bit of empirical support for the claim that "an individual will respond
differently depending on how the question is asked of him," insisting on "proper emphasis [on]
the differentiation of institutions for putting the question-e.g., the market institution to elicit
private oriented responses and political institutions for those which are commonly oriented," see
Maass, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to Public Investment Decision, 80 Q.J. EcoN. 216-17
(1966).
"'See notes 73-74, supra & text accompanying.
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sent to the polls, in her capacity as a registered voter, to act on a matter
before the whole city with which she, supposedly, continuingly identifies and
which maintains a continuing salience in her consciousness of political life.
While it is worth suggesting that such a Rousseauian vision of politics
may have played a part in the Court's decision and choice of rhetoric in the
Eastlake case, it should not be suggested that Rousseau's argument, properly
understood, can justify that decision. Certainly there is a serious question
whether direct-democratic procedures can be expected to elicit authentic ex-
pressions of a general will when used sporadically in large and politically
apathetic electorates.1 3 7 Lacking any evidence on the point, it would be
foolhardy to assume that contemporary Eastlake is a modem incarnation of
eighteenth-century Geneva. Beyond that difficulty, Rousseau certainly would
have objected that the form of the zoning-change question presented to the
Eastlake electorate was far too particularistic, far too remote from any in-
telligible issue of general principle or general rule, to allow the members of
the electorate responding to that question to be regarded as the sovereign
people whose legislative utterances express a general will, or reflect the ideal
of self-government.
1 3 8
1"See, e.g., Wolfinger & Greenstein supra note 128 at 767-68. Rousseau's own deep con-
cerns about sustaining the citizenry's political morale are in evidence throughout THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT.
'Rousseau would have said that on this occasion the electorate was not legislating, but ac-
ting in the role which Rousseau variously styles that of the "prince," "executive," "magistrate," or
"government." Compare the Ohio Supreme Court's somewhat surprising concession, in the
Eastlake case below, that the zoning change presented a "legislative" (not an "admininstrative")
question and therefore was subject to the Ohio constitution's referendum provisions. 41 Ohio St.
2d at 191, 324 N.E.2d at 743-. The court's position may have been that the issue was suitable
for determination by referendum (i.e., was "legislative") because the proposed development
might have had significant city-wide ramifications. But in Rousseau's scheme, true legislation, ex-
pressive of the general will, is that which is "mutual; and [its] nature is such that in fulfilling [its
obligations] we cannot work for others without working for ourselves." It must be cast in such a
way that "there is not a man who does not think of 'each' as meaning him, and consider himself
in voting for all . . . . The general will, to be really such, must be general in its object as well as
its essence; ... it must both come from all and apply to all; and ... it loses its natural rectitude
when it is directed to some particular and determinate object, because in such a case we are
judging of something foreign to us, and have no true principle of equity to guide us." J. -J.
RoussEAU, supra note 24, at 29. The same chord is struck time and again throughout THE
SOCIAL CONTACT, see, e.g., id. at 27, 30-31, 35, 36, 54.
This is of course not to say that all legitimate political acts must be legislative, must be acts
of sovereignty, in Rousseau's sense of embodying general and mutual principles and rules. Ob-
viously, the laws have to be applied to particular cases and there is thus a role for an executive
and a judge. Nor is there any ultimate reason why the democracy itself may not play these roles
in addition to that of sovereign legislator, see id. at 99, though Rousseau seems to have thought
such arrangments risky and unwise: "It is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them,
or for the body of the people to turn its attention away from a general standpoint and devote it
to particular objects. Nothing is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public
affairs, and the abuse of the laws by the government is a less evil than the corruption of the
legislator, which is the inevitable sequel to a particular standpoint." Id. at 65: "Were it possible
for the sovereign, as such, to possess the executive power, right and fact would be so confounded
that no one could tell what was law and what was not; and the body politic, thus disfigured,
would soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent." (emphasis supplied). See also
id. 97. It follows that every conferral of executive or judicial authority must itself take the form
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So while ascription to the Court of a Rousseauian public-interest concep-
tion of politics plainly comes closer than ascription of an economic, public-
choice conception to explaining the opinion and decision in Eastlake, no
more than a relative advantage can be claimed. A bit of reflection will show
that the Rousseauian public-interest model also works at least as well as the
economic model for Carter Coal, Eubank, Roberge, Euclid, and Gorieb.
But then what about the old nemesis, Cusack? It will be recalled that a
previous discussion succeeded in giving an economic account of Cusack, but
at the heavy price of knocking the public purpose doctrine out of the
economically approved category. 3 9 Can Rousseauian public-interest theory do
better? From the standpoint of a concern about ceremonial context, the
Chicago scheme upheld in Cusack, no less that the Richmond one struck
down in Eubank, left things to a "narrow segment" or "limited group" unlike-
ly to be perceived by its members as a true civic forum rather than a bat-
tlefield or market. 40 Imputing to the Supreme Court a Rousseauian sort of
community self-determination model of government would seem, then, to
leave Cusack in an anomalous position. Certainly we cannot impute that sort
of thinking to the Court that decided Cusack, but as for the contemporary
Court-the Court that decided Eastlake-things look a bit brighter. For that
Court dealt with Cusack in a cautious way that would leave intact any at-
tribution to it of a Rousseauian vision. Whereas the Eastlake opinion seems to
of true (general) law, even-or especially-where such authority is to be exercised by the whole
electorate. See, e.g., id. at 97-99.
Now in the case of the Eastlake zoning referendum there was no "law" in Rousseau's sense
to govern the "executive" decision about whether to allow Forest City's zoning change-no
general rule or principle, enacted in such a way as to impinge mutually on the interests of each
citizen. Nor did the special charter provision for zoning referendums itself meet the standards of
generality required for a true act of legislation. (We might note in passing how Rousseau's argu-
ment would condemn not only the Eastlake procedure but also that approved by the Supreme
Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).)
The problem of framing legislation so that it will have the kind of generality and mutuality
of impact needed to satisfy the conditions of Rousseau's argument for the possibility of discover-
ing a general will through voting, and at the same time will be sufficiently trenchant actually to
control the decision of executive and judicial officials, is, obviously, a vexing one. It is known to
modern American administrative law in the guise of "delegation" doctrine. See, e.g., McGautha
v. California, 402 U.S. 182, 270 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.). I know of no demonstration
that the problem has a solution. Certainly Rousseau offers no such demonstration. Compare
LEvINE. supra note 20, at 48-49. What he offers, rather, is an argument that such a solution
must be possible if political freedom-and, therefore, moral freedom-is to be possible in and
through a democratic state.
'See notes 99-103 & text accompanying.
1"From the standpoint of a concern about generality of legislation the Chicago scheme was
actually worse than the Richmond one: In Eubank the neighbors in imposing the setback line at
least had to impose it generally, on themselves as well as others, whereas in Cusack the releases
were to be granted or witheld on a case-by-case- basis. Thus the lack of standards created risks of
favoritism and discrimination in Cusack not-at least not so obviously and directly-present in
Eubank. The extent to which such risks were present in that situation would seem to have varied
from block to block, depending on what proportion of a block's building lots were already
developed, with what degree of uniformity in the setback distances of houses already built.
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imply continuing approval of Eubank and Roberge even in the course of
distinguishing them, the opinion's treatment of Cusack is both more subdued
and more equivocal: Eubank and Roberge (which superficially seem opposed
to the Eastlake result) are dealt with in the opinion's text, while Cusack
(which superficially seems supportive of the Eastlake result) is relegated to a
footnote-a footnote which non-committally relates that "since the property
owners could simply waive an otherwise applicable legislative limitation, the
Court in Cusack determined that the provision did not delegate legislative
power at all."141 Nothing is vouchsafed about the contemporary Court's ap-
praisal of its prededessor's oft-questioned analysis.142 In short, probably the
best thing that can be said about Cusack from the Rousseauian standpoint is
that it is wrong. And the Eastlake Court is not saying differently.
IV. A COMPARISON OF THE DESCRIPTIVE POWER OF THE Two MODELS
So far, by looking in detail at the explanatory value of two basic models
of governmental legitimacy in relation to two judicial doctrines-public pur-
pose and delegation-this essay has produced just a few bits of evidence in
support of a sweeping claim which remains unproven: that in judicial treat-
ment of public law problems, a noneconomic ideal conception of politics as a
vehicle for community self-determination competes strongly with an economic
ideal conception of politics as a vehicle for private self-maximization. Judges,
the evidence suggests, go about their public-law work in the grip of these two
opposed models. As a way of further exploring the content of the models and
their oppositional relationship, and also of further investigating the clarifying
potential of this two-models thesis, it may be useful to probe an area of law
particularly related to local governments-zoning-by considering another
puzzling pair of Supreme Court decisions-a recent pair, this time-which
seem to have split on the question of the constitutionality of "single-family
zoning."
In Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974),143 the Court upheld a zoning ordinance
enacted by a very small village (it occupied about one square mile and in-
cluded 220 homes inhabited by 700 persons), restricting the use of village
land to dwellings for but one "family," defined so as to exclude any
"'426 U.S. at 677-78 n. 12.
"
t See, e.g., Hogue, supra note 72; Delegation to Private Parties in American Constitutional
Law, 50 IND. L.J. 650, 675-80 (1975); HALE, supra note 78; McBain, Law-Making By Property-
Owners, 36 POL. SCL Q. 617 (1921). It is worth noting that the Court's opinion in Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1974), had reiterated the Roberge Court's idea (see text following note
69, supra) that the Cusack ordinance was distinguishable from that in Roberge because the use
regulated in Cusack was, as that in Roberge was not, a noxious one, likely "to work ... injury,
inconvenience or annoyance to the community, the district, or [some] person." The Court's ap-
parent retreat, in the Eastlake opinion, from that line of defense for Cusack seems consistent with
the thesis advanced here. In a Rousseauian type of public-interest conception of politics, it would
be repugnant to propose that my commercial billboard might be obnoxious in the neighborhood




household group of more than two persons not all related to one another by
blood, marriage, or adoption.14 4 It was asserted by those attacking the or-
dinance that it trenched upon constitutionally protected interests in privacy
and free association. The ordinance was, indeed, so designed that it would
have the following effects: (i) it would deter unmarried couples from having
children if they wished neither to leave Belle Terre nor to get married; (ii) it
would bring pressure on unmarried couples to get married if they wished
both to remain in Belle Terre and have children; (iii) it would require the
removal from the village of couples willing neither to marry nor to remain
childless; and (iv) it would completely bar from Belle Terre households com-
posed of several unaffiliated adults. Thus the ordinance could very possibly
constrain individuals in their choices regarding marital status, or family
household composition, and certainly could penalize (or at any rate burden)
individuals who refused to be so constrained. If those choices were constitu-
tionally protected (under the rubrics of "association" or "privacy"), then, ac-
cording to the prevailing canons of adjudication implicity accepted by both
sides, it would be incumbent on the village to justify its encroachment in this
constitutionally protected zone by showing that the encroachment was
"necessary" to satisfy some "compelling interest" of the state or village." 45
Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court majority, concluded that
no constitutionally protected interests in privacy or association were involved,
that the ordinance was just an ordinary instance of "economic and social
legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect...
if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary' . . . and bears 'a rational relationship
to a [permissible] state objective.' "146 No doubt there were permissible objec-
tives in plain sight: "A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land use project ad-
dressed to family needs. ... 47 But since, as Justice Marshall's dissent amply
showed, these anticongestion goals might have been addressed more directly
by regulations not intruding into household composition choices,148 everything
depended on the Court's surprising categorization of the Belle Terre or-
dinance as plain economic and social legislation, so that the village could
justify it by showing it to have a mere tendency towards some permissible
goal, without having to show public necessity or lack of less restrictive alter-
natives.
The Court's easy denial that constitutionally protected personal in-
terests-civil liberties-were jeopardized by the Belle Terre ordinance is sur-
prising. The plaintiffs' contrary claim" 9 was at least respectable, demanding
1"Id. at 2.
14'See id. at 7-8; id. at 12-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'Id. at 8.
'Id. at 9.
1"Id. at 12, 18-20. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'
49Although the plaintiffs' interest has occasionally been deprecated as a purely economic
one in saving expenses by sharing living quarters, they asserted the civil-libertarian interest in
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more serious refutation then the Court produced. There had been a number
of prior decisions, invalidating state laws intruding on individual choice
respecting such matters as marriage, divorce, intra-marital sex relations, pro-
creation, child rearing, family planning, and education. Commentators had
offered powerful suggestions about how to array and interpret those decisions
as jointly reflecting a notion of constitutionally protected family privacy,
rooted in an appreciation of the household grouping as a kind of protected
zone within which values might be generated and nurtured-values that
might provide the alternatives and suggest the new directions needed to pre-
vent the solidification and stagnation of values that might otherwise occur in
a monolithic society.150 The Court itself has since signified agreement that the
prior decisions were properly arrayed together in a "privacy" group, though it
has not espoused any similar-or indeed any very informative-rationale for
the privacy notion that has thus collected together a number of decisions
which earlier had been seen as unrelated.1 5 1
Yet Justice Douglas' opinion makes only a brief and evasive-almost, it
seems, uncomprehending-response to the privacy and association claims:
"The ordinance places no ban on . . . forms of association, for a [legal]
'family' may, so far as the ordinance is concerned, entertain whomever they
like. '" 1 52 How is one to explain this apparent insensitivity to a fairly
straightforward civil-liberties claim, on the part of this Justice who has never
been thought to be either obtuse or an enemy to civil liberties-who has, in-
deed, been described as "the most ardent and explicit champion of lifestyle
freedom yet to sit on the Court?"153
Three years after upholding the Belle Terre ordinance, the Court again
confronted a suburban single-family zoning restriction. This time, in Moore
v. East Cleveland, 1 5 4 civil liberties prevailed and the ordinance was ruled in-
valid. East Cleveland's somewhat unusual and complicated regulation could
be roughly described as exluding not only nonfamilial household groupings,
but also "extended" as distinguished from "nuclear" families.1 5 One of its
their complaint (see Appendix on Appeal, Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), and that
assertion was never found to have been disingenuous.
150See Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 53
B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973).
'Special constitutional protection for a category of autonomy-related interests collected
under the rubric of "privacy"-including free choice regarding "matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education"-has recently
been confirmed by the Court. "In these areas," says the Court, "it has been held that there are
limitations on the State's power to substantively regulate conduct." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 & n. 26 (1977), quoting from Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Carey v. Popula-
tion Services Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (1977).
152416 U.S. at 9.
'
53Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Life-Styles, 62 Cornell L. Rev.
563, 564 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Wilkinson & White].
154431 U.S. 494 (1977).
1551d. at 496 & n.2, 500, 504; id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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particular features was to distinguish among households containing a grand-
parent and more than one grandchild, admitting such households if all the
grandchildren were one another's siblings but excluding them if any pair were
first cousins. The appellant was an East Cleveland homeowner appealing
from a criminal conviction and fine for having harbored two grandchildren,
first cousins, in her home.
Writing for a plurality of four Justices, 15 6 Justice Powell relied on a civil-
libertarian position similar to that which had been unavailing with the Belle
Terre majority of which he had been a member-the position that, "[as] this
Court has long recognized ... freedom of personal choice in matters of mar-
riage and family life is one of the liberties [particularly] protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Because the East Cleveland
ordinance "intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, [the]
Court must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regula-
tion." Examined from that standpoint, various anticongestion goals cited by
East Cleveland could not justify its ordinance, because "the ordinance . . .
serves them marginally at best."'157 Of course, the same was true of the Belle
Terre ordinance, 15 8 but it was distinguished as not encroaching on a "private
realm of family life,"- evidently meaning by "family" not simply a domestic
househQld group, but a group mutually linked by "blood, adoption, or mar-
riage."' 5 9 The only reason offered in defense of this distinction was that "the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural."1 60
Two Belle Terre dissenters who joined Justice Powell's East Cleveland opi-
nion also, through Justice Brennan, contributed some additional views of
their own. Although they might consistently have dealt with the Belle Terre
case by simply sticking to their earlier position that it was wrongly decided, 16
they instead said that it was distinguishable because the Belle Terre or-
dinance did not, as the East Cleveland ordinance did, "inhibit [in any man-
ner] the choice of related individuals to constitute a family, whether in the
'nuclear' or 'extended' form."1 62 But they offered no account at all of the con-
stitutional relevance of this distinction.
"'6Including Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
"1431 U.S. at 500.
15sSee note 148 supra, and text accompanying.
151431 U.S. at 498.
"OId. at 503-04.
161Justice Marshall had dissented on the merits, 416 U.S. 1, 12, while Justice Brennan had
declined to reach the merits, id. at 10. Both Justices may have abandoned further resistance to
Belle Terre in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (dissenting opinion of
Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.
162431 U.S. at 511 (Brennan J., concurring emphasis in original).
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One more vote-that of Justice Stevens-was needed to swing the Court's
five-to-four decision against the validity of the East Cleveland ordinance. In
Justice Stevens' view, the constitutionally protected right infringed by that
regulation was not a special right of self-determination in matters relating to
family life, but a general property owners' "fundamental right"-"to decide
who may reside on [one's] property," or, still more generally,-"to use [one's]
own property as [one] sees fit," short of creating a "nuisance" that "impair[s]
the enjoyment of other property in the vicinity" or violating a community land-
use scheme having a "substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare." 163 The challenged feature of the East Cleveland or-
dinance could not satisfy this "substantial relation to general welfare" test
because the city could not possibly "explain the need for a rule which would
allow a homeowner to have two grandchildren live with her if they are
brothers, but not if they are cousins."116' Apparently perceiving that families-
only type ordinances-including Belle Terre's-would be generally vulnerable
to like objection,1 65 Justice Stevens expressed sympathy for a series of "well
reasoned" state court decisions protecting the rights of "unrelated persons to
occupy single-family residences notwithstanding an ordinance prohibiting,
either expressly or implicity, such occupancy. 5 166 Even so, he defended the
Belle Terre decision (in a footnote) as "upholding a single-family ordinance
as one primarily concerned with the prevention of transiency in a small, quiet
suburban community." 167
All of the reasons advanced by the majority Justices for distinguishing
between the East Cleveland and Belle Terre ordinances are deeply unsatisfy-
ing. The difficulty with Justice Stevens' "transiency" point is its stark
nakedness. No explanation is offered either of why or how transiency might
be regarded as an evil, or of why unaffiliated households might be thought
more prone than "families" to be transient in whatever sense is supposed to
be relevant.1 68 The Belle Terre decision itself sheds no light on these ques-
tions, because it made no reference to any interest on the villagers' part in
avoiding transiency, relying rather on their interests in avoiding congestion
and in maintaining "family values" - interests on which Justice Stevens,
evidently, though it inappropriate to rely.
1611d. at 513, 520 (Stevens J., concurring).
"'Id. at 520.
'Children would apparently not pose a special threat to public welfare just because their
parents were not intermarried.
'16Id. at 516-17.
1'7Id. at 519 n.15.
1"The plaintiffs in the Belle Terre case were, as the Court's opinion noted in passing,
"students at [a] nearby State University" campus. 416 U.S. at 2-3. But the Court's reasoning in
no way relied on this fact; nor did the opinion even advert to it again, unless we count the
paragraph reading: "The regimes of boardinghouses, fraternity houses, and the like present ur-
ban problems. More people occupy a given space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more




Justice Brennan's concurring opinion simply makes no attempt to defend
the plurality's distinction between "families" and household groupings of
unrelated persons, accepting the former but rejecting the latter as bearers of
constitutionally protected interests in domestic self-determination. So Justice
Powell's opinion for the plurality must bear the entire burden of that defense.
Now doubtless there are policy arguments for trying to preserve the strength
of traditional family forms in society, 69 and doubtless these are strong
enough that a finding of constitutional impediment to certain govenmental
efforts in that direction170 is not "lightly" to be made. 71 Doubtless, too, "the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion."' 72 But from none of these premises does the conclusion follow that "the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family"'73 in the sense required by
the joint results of the Belle Terre and East Cleveland cases-that is,
validating governmental direct censorship of nontraditional ("unrelated") in
favor of traditional ("related") household groupings in favor of traditional
("related") household groupings. 74 In fact Justice Powell's proposition that
"the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family"'7 5 - in that or any
other sense - is certainly false if taken as a literal report of anything the
Constitution says. Such constitutional protection, if detectible at all, can only
be an inference from the document viewed as a whole- as a presumably
169"The nuclear, heterosexual family is charged with several of society's most essential func-
tions. It has served as an important means of educating the young; it has often provided
economic support and psychological comfort to family members; and it has operated as the unit
upon which basic governmental policies in such matters as taxation, conscription, and in-
heritance have been based. Family life has been a central unifying experience throughout
American society. Preserving the strength of this basic, organic unit is a central and legitimate
end of the police power." Wilkinson & White, supra note 153, at 568-69.
"
5 An opposite result in the Belle Terre case, invalidating direct, regulatory proscription of
unconventional household groupings, would leave open many possible avenues for a governmen-
tal policy of encouraging the formation and maintenance of conventional family units. The
preceding footnote suggests some of them, but hardly exhausts the possibilities-some of which,
however, seem foreclosed by such decisions as United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
'""Law is a vehicle by which democratic majorities reaffirm shared moral aspirations and
summon society's allegiance to a common set of behavioral goals. Deploying the constitution to
undermine conventional precepts of domestic morality is a step not lightly taken." Wilkinson &
White, supra note 153, at 568.
111431 U.S. at 503.
111431 U.S. at 503.
174Patriotic observance, to take just one example for comparison, has also been a traditional
institution in our country from its beginnings, and it is one for the sustenance of which im-
pressive policy arguments can be summoned and various nonregulatory means doubtless
employed. But does the Court think it follows that village governments are free to enact bans
against those who decline to partake of-or even those who actively but peaceably oppose-such
observance? See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). It is
interesting that precisely such a distinction between direct regulatory proscription and less coer-
cive means of "influencing" or "encouraging" private decisions lies at the heart of Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court in the extremely controversial case of Maher v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2383
(1977). See also Califano v. Jobst, 98 S. Ct. 95, 99-100 & n.11 (1977).
111431 U.S. at 503.
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coherent plan having underlying moral premises, themselves implicit but in-
telligible through a parsing of the constitutional plan's overall "structure and
relationships." 176 And when we consider that a main pillar-if not a
keystone-in that structure is the first amendment, an inference that govern-
ments are not only constitutionally bound to respect traditional household
forms, but are also constitutionally authorized to censor nontraditional ones,
becomes problematic to say the least. 177 The difficulty is only aggravated, not
alleviated, when-in the light cast by the first amendment-one heeds
Justice Powell's injunction to open "our eyes to the basic reasons why certain
rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,' 7 T8 and reflects on his suggestion
that a crucial reason is that "it is through the family that we inculcate and
pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural."' 79 While
1"See generally C. BLACK. STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969);
Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights
(pt. 2) 1974 DUKE L.J. 533-34 & n.20, discussing Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17-19 (1971). It is true, of course, that Justice Powell's
plurality opinion purports to rest on the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of "liberty" against
governmental deprivation without due process of law. But "liberty" is an exceedingly vague no-
tion and the plurality's limiting idea of the "rational continuum," borrowed from the second
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522, 543, (1961), seems to
recur to a structuralist conception: "[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms
of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational con-
tinuum . . . which recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain in-
terests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment." 431 U.S. at
17 7"[A]s with the first amendment, lifestyle proptection may require defense of the most
idiosyncratic among us in order to discourage, at the outer perimerter, the state's natural inclina-
tion to compel its citizens to think and behave in orthodox patterns." Wilkinson & White, supra
note 153, at 613.
"Pierce struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend the State's
public schools, holding that the Constitution 'excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only.' . . . By the same token the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standar-
dizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined
family patterns."
431 U.S. at (plurality opinion of Powell, J.). But why doesn't the same apply if we substitute
"Belle Terre" for "East Cleveland" in that last sentence? "There will," after all, "always be some
Americans who resist traditional conceptions of family life and regard the favored legal status of
the nuclear family as economically oppressive and a source of indignity and affront." Wilkinson
& White, supra note 153, at 68. Why is it that governments are free to "standardize" them?
171431 U.S. at 501.
17Id. at 503-04. Compare Wilkinson & White, supra note 153, at 623:
Arguably, the state has no legitimate interest in restricting living arrangements to a
narrow ideal of domestication: to, for example, the middle class family of four safely
cottaged in the suburbs. That model has been with us too briefly and is changing too
quickly to be the real basis of the state's concern in this area. Rather, the state's pro-
per concern derives from the basic functions performed by 'family' units in society
from sexual fulfillment and reproduction, to education and rearing of the young, to
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none of this quite proves that the Belle Terre decision is wrong,180 it does, I
believe, amply show that Justice Powell's defense of that decision in East
Cleveland is inadequate and unconvincing as it stands. And so the stage is set
for asking whether either- or both- of the two suggested judicial "models" of
local-government legitimacy can point the way towards a more authentic and
satisfying account of the joint results in the Belle Terre and East Cleveland
cases than the Court's opinions reveal.
From the economically inspired, market-failure ("public choice") justifica-
tion for governmental authority, one can derive a fairly persuasive defense for
the Belle Terre ordinance. Environmental or atmospheric factors-including
a factor best entitled "moral ambience" - might certainly count as a signifi-
cant type of spillover or public good (bad).18 1 Prevalence of a uniformly
"familistic" type of ambience in one's local community is a condition that any
individual household might value highly, and in addition is a somewhat
delicate condition easily subject to destruction by the presence of nonconfor-
ming households who would (granting the reciprocity of it all' 8 2) thereby be
impairing the welfare of others. Beyond the question of the ambience itself
there is the related question of the local public budget: how heavily the com-
munity members shall tax themselves and how the proceeds shall be
distributed among various possible objectives such as public protection, educ-
tion, recreation. There is a good economic argument to the effect that the ef-
ficiency of a majoritarian fiscal regime is maximized when homogeneity of
preferences among the citizenry is also maximized - essentially, that when
preferences coincide, political externality costs and political transaction costs
are both minimized, or, putting it another way, that as preferences increas-
ingly coincide, the majoritarian process approaches closer to the Pareto-ideal
condition of frictionless consensus or unanimity; 88 and, of course, regulatory
screening of prospective entrants by a criterion of conformity to the establish-
ed familistic norm can be construed as a device for assuring convergence of
preferences on those typical for normal families.184
economic support and emotional security .... [These] vital purposes of thi family...
appear to require some fidelity and constancy of relationship.
Was the Court, perhaps, privy to some evidence that household groups without a marriage bond are
peculiarly lacking in fidelity and constancy? Is there any such evidence?
"'See notes 181-189, 193-95, infra & text accompanying for arguments supporting the decision.
'It should so count in a normative economic conception of politics, even if not in an objectivist
conception in which the fundamental aim is something like "equal concern and respect" for each
person, rather than maximum realization of private preferences. See R. DwORKIN TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 275-78 (1977).
18t Granting, that is, that the effect of a regulation like Belle Terre's is to impair the welfare of
persons like the plaintiffs.
113See, e.g., Hirsch, The Efficiency of Restrictive Land Use Instruments, 53 LAND ECON. 145,
151-52 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hirsch]; McGuire, Group Segregation and OptimalJurisdictions,
82J. POL. ECON. 112 (1974); R. BISH. & H. NOURSE. URBAN ECONOMICS AND POLICY ANALYSIS 129-31
(1975) [hereinafter cited as BIsH & NOURSE]; BISH. supra note 45 at 46-53.
1841t is, indeed, a more efficient sorting device than other forms of "snob" zoning which have
sometimes been recognized as conducive to the purpose, e.g., BISH & NoURSE. supra note 183. See
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The economic defense of the Belle Terre ordinance is, however, in-
complete, (or, conversely, proves too much) until note is taken of both the
community's size and its position within a surrounding constellation of com-
munities. With its capacity of at least 220 households, Belle Terre could fair-
ly claim to be too large to achieve a uniform ambience, at feasible transac-
tions cost, through voluntary consensual agreements embodied in restrictive
convenants.'8 5 On the other hand, Belle Terre is plainly small enough (one
square mile) to make implausible any claim that by its regulation it was
monopolizing some relevant market (in local community ambiences or
budget-packages), thereby impeding the achievement of efficiency in that
market. In this light the Court's highlighting of Belle Terre's small size'1 6 is
noteworthy, as is the fact, asserted by the village and never contradicted, that
opportunities existed elsewhere in the relevant market area for indulgence in
non-familistic living arrangements by those with non-familistic preferences.' 87
The Belle Terre ordinance thus presents an analogue to the segregation-of-
incompatible-uses rationale for certain kinds of use-zoning that some'88 but
not all' 89 economic analysts have found plausible. The Belle Terre regulation
certainly externalizes some costs onto persons like the plaintiffs, for whom
(presumably) no available alternative is quite as favorable as living, non-
familistically, in Belle Terre; yet it may be reasonable to think that the
scheme copes so effectively with other externalities which whould arise in its
absence as to be, on the whole, a positive contribution towards efficiency in
the use of metropolitan land.
If, however, the economic model of legitimacy thus accounts for the Belle
Terre decision, how can it also handle the opposite East Cleveland decision?
The subjectivist-individualist attitude of economics apparently would foreclose
any possibility of suggesting that non-familistic intrusions upon a familistic
ambience are somehow a more real, a more valid, spillover than are "extend-
ed family" intrusions upon a "nuclear family" ambience. 90 If the Belle Terre
ordinance is to be explained or rationalized as an economically prudent
device for minimizing externalities (reflecting the present villagers' actual,
private preferences as combined through majoritarian procedures), it is hard
to see how a like rationalization can be denied to the East Cleveland or-
dinance. We may not be able to fathom a significant preference for a
Hirsh, supra note 183, at 152-53. A regulatory sorting device is not superfluous-one could not rely
on private, voluntary choices to sort metropolitan populations into municipal groupings characteriz-
ed by internally convergent, if externally divergent, preferences- because there are counter-
incentives stemming from the property-tax system of local finance. See id. at 148, 151.
185See note 77, supTa & text accompanying.
186By devoting the first two sentences of the opinion to this feature. 416 U.S. at 2.
"'?See Appendix on Appeal, Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, A46-A47 (1974). Jurisdictional
Statement in id., at 57a-58a (unreported opinion of the trial court).
188See, e.g., Ohis, Weisberg & White, The Effect of Zoning on Land Value, 1 J. URB. ECON.
428, 440 (1974).
1"9 See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHoUT ZONING (1972).
"'0See note 31 supra & text accompanying.
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"nuclear" as opposed to an "extended" family ambience, but those in East
Cleveland, as the outcome of their majoritarian procedure presumptively
shows, evidently have that preference notwithstanding its general
mysteriousness. Of course, East Cleveland is many times bigger than Belle
Terre. 91 But not only does nothing in any of the majority Justices' opinions
even hint at any significance in that fact; more important is the lack of
anything to indicate that East Cleveland is so large (or otherwise so situated)
as to render its regulatory scheme monopolistic or preclusive of opportunities
for extended-family living for those who prefer it.t9 The conclusion is clear:
Imputation to the Justices of the economic model of legitimacy succeeds
rather nicely in explaining Belle Terre, but at best indifferently in explaining
East Cleveland.
How well can these decisions be explained by imputing a community-self-
determination type of public-interest model of legitimacy? Certainly some of
Justice Douglas' rhetoric in Belle Terre seems to reflect such a conception:
"The police power," he said, "is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area
a sanctuary for people."'93 It is not hard to see how the conception would
tend to justify the Belle Terre ordinance for surely the members of a small
village population, much as those of a residential household, can easily be
seen as a group having a vital interest in room to choose a community-
defining (and thus a self-defining) set of values, or way of life, or moral am-
bience. The arguments in favor of endowing community-sized groups with
such capacity look, indeed, very like those for creating and protecting a free-
choice capacity for household groups. 94 So how can the plaintiffs interest in
determining their way of life be legally entitled to prevail over the villagers'
quite parallel and equally weighty interest? The villagers (as a village group)
wish to nurture traditional family values. The plaintiffs (as a household
group) would nurture something else. Why should the plaintiffs prevail-at
least as long as they can, without great loss or inconvenience, live nondisrup-
"'According to the 1970 U.S. Census, the population of East Cleveland was 39,600.
"'See 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting). In appraising the likelihood of such preclusion, it
may be relevant that East Cleveland is a majority-black municipality. See 431 U.S. at 508-10 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). There may not be many-perhaps there are no-other Cleveland suburbs with
both living conditions and demographic features reasonably matching East Cleveland's.
"'3416 U.S. at 9 (emphasis supplied).
194See note 150, supra & text accompanying. The possibility of such an explanation of the
Belle Terre decision is recognized, but not-as it seems to me-taken seriously enough, by Raggi,
An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 24-25, 28
n.107 (1977). Raggi's objection to justifying the decision by appeal to "a competing associational
interest ...of the townspeople in living in and maintaining a certain lifestyle" (id. at 24) ap-
parently is that such a justification would endorse an "absolute right of . . . a majority . . .to
dictate the disposal of another's propety." Id. at 25. But that observation, even if correct, only
sharpens and dramatizes-it does not resolve-the dilemma posed by the case. See L. TRIBE.
AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 977-79 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE], and the observation
may not be correct. See notes 199-205, infra & text accompanying.
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tively somewhere else? For a Justice entertaining any such idea, its most
straightforward translation into the parlance of two-tier equal protection doc-
trine would have been to say that even though the plaintiffs do have constitu-
tionally favored or fundamental interests at stake, the state also has a con-
stitutionally favored or compelling justification for allowing the village
population to work out and establish its choice. But to state the case that way
requires explicit assertion and defense of the proposition that protected zones
for community choice are, like protected zones for household choice, a part
of a "constitution of liberty."195 If the Justice were not quite ready to assert
and defend that position-but at some level of awareness were drawn to
it-he might temporize by some such device as forcing the Belle Terre or-
dinance into the unlikely mold of mere economic and social legislation.
This non-economic, community self-determination account of the Belle
Terre decision bears an interesting comparison with the economic account
proposed above.1 96 While this account does not depend, as that one did, on
Belle Terre's being large enough to sustain it, it does depend, as that one also
did, on Belle Terre's being small enough to sustain it-or, more precisely, on
Belle Terre's being a minor enough part of a larger complex of communities
or potential communities. For if there were no place but Belle Terre to which
the plaintiffs could feasibly repair to live nondisruptively according to their
own lights,, then given the lack of of grounds for preferring the villagers'
lights to those of the plaintiffs, the proper disposition would seem to be to
make the villagers allow the plaintiffs some room in which to live their lives,
despite the unfortunate, resulting partial impairment of the villagers' ability
to live theirs.197 It is only because the plaintiffs can reasonably be asked to
live elsewhere that the villagers' already established way of life seems to entitle
them to stand their ground. 98 Thus there is an anti-monopoly qualifier in
both the economic and the community self-determination accounts of the
Belle Terre ordinance's validity-a partial commonality which suggests the
possibility that the two accounts may not be so antithetical, at bottom, as
they may sometimes appear to be.
Now how well does the community self-determination account succeed in
explaining the East Cleveland decision? Can one say that it works, in that the
East Cleveland regulation embodies no intelligible effort at value definition
(or formation, or reshaping), so there is no state interest in permitting that
19See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). Professor Hayek might not cheer
this application of his neat locution, but I do not see how he could deny its fittingness.
"'See notes 174-82 supra & text accompanying.
1"7See TmBE, supra note 194, at 983. More precisely, this would be the proper disposition in a
normative conception of government which was objectivist in the compound sense of (i) incor-
porating the view that joint definition of values at the community level is a critical dimension of
personal freedom (see note 30, supra and text accompanying), and (ii) incorporating a belief that
that view itself has an objective basis, in a moral theory rooted in reason and including some
such axiom as the claim of each person to "equal respect and concern" (see note 181, supra).
"'8See TRIBE, supra note 194 at 983.
1977-1978]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
regulation which can justify the infringement of the plaintiffs own interest in
self-determination? The argument would be that there is no intelligible or
recognizable value, or value system, or ideal social vision, or moral concep-
tion, that anyone could be trying to discover or realize by favoring nuclear
over extended families-or, better, that there is no such intelligible value
system or moral conception which one could thus be trying to realize without
thereby vilating a special constitutional injunction against invidiously race-
related distinctions' 99-so that the true purpose of the ordinance may be sup-
posed to lie elsewhere. If no one could find the words through which even to
begin an explanation, in terms anyone else could even begin to understand
(unless by reference to invidious socio-cultural stereotyping), or what ideal
form of life inspires the preference for nuclear over extended families; if no
one could verbally evoke (even if only intuitively or suggestively) a cogent
relationship between that preference and some more inclusive and com-
prehensible vision of life (unless a vision made coherent only by an invidious
racial stereotype), then the ordinance is not a (constitutionally admissible) ef-
fort at community self-determination and must be regarded as if aimed at
some mundane goal-such as minimizing public school costs-which cannot
override the plaintiffs interest in self-determination.
It is not, as might be thought, an objection to this view that even though
the outsider can find no intelligible moral point or direction in-a preference
for nuclear over extended families, the East Clevelanders might have grasped
or intuited some such significance in it. A like objection was cited as a reason
for doubting whether the East Cleveland decision could be defended in an
economic conception which would, at the same time, justify the Belle Terre
ordinance. 200 But the objection there reflected the deep subjectivism of the
economic standpoint, and it does not carry over to the objectivist standpoint
from which community self-determination is a valued process. Economics in-
sists (methodologically20 1) on the essential privacy and arbitrariness- the
a-rationality-of all values. But that proposition is denied by the Kantian (or
Rousseauian) philosophy that underlies the notion of community self-
determination as a condition of personal freedom. 20 2 In that philosophy it
must be possible to reject formulations of ends (as well as selections of means)
because they are unreasonable; and so it must likewise be possible to say, of
this or that formulation, that no one could reasonably think it.20 Granted
'See 431 U.S. 509-10 (Brennan, J., concurring), noting that extended-family living ar-
rangements are "especially familiar among black families," and in that light deploring the
"cultural myopia" and "depressing insensitivity" displayed by the East Cleveland ordinance
(although forbearing from any attribution to the city government of a racially discriminatory
motivation).
lssSee note 191 supra & text accompanying.
O'See note 31 supra.
202See note 30 supra and text accompanying.
"0'See M. HORKHEIMER. ECLIPSE OF REASON 3-57, 162-187, esp. at 43, 174 (paper ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as HORKHEIMER]. TRIBE. supra note 194, at 989, seems to agree in principle
with the position taken here but to doubt its proper application to the East Cleveland case.
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there would be more than a touch of presumption in a judge's passing judg-
ment on whether some asserted but ineffable end or value, known or iden-
tified only by its supposed connection with some preference for a specified
social state such as families-only, or nuclear-families-only, is reasonable or in-
telligible as such. Presumptuousness of that sort seems to be endemic in the
role of the judge,204 even (or especially) in the economic conception of that
role. 205 In the end, whether in the economic conception or the one here il-
lustrated, the judge has to fall back on an educated sense of how people
think, feel, or want.
The result of this discussion suggests that, as between the two proposed
models of local-government legitimacy, imputation to the Supreme Court of a
community self-determination model does the better job of explaining the
Court's dispositions in the Belle Terre and East Cleveland cases taken
together. Readers can review the arguments-possibly revise them-and come
to their own conclusions.
V. THE INTELLECTUAL SITUATION IN
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION
No grand generalizations are warranted by the fragmentary evidence
presented here. At most it may suggest that a community self-determination
model of local-government legitimacy competes with an economically inspired
public-choice model in the adjudication of "open" 20 6 questions arising under
the few public-law doctrines examined above. One cannot say, on this
evidence, whether the competition described obtains over a significantly
broader range of public-law questions or, if it does, whether these loose for-
mulations of the models are the most trenchant or fruitful ones with which to
attempt a description of any such broader opposition or irresolution (respec-
ting political ideals) as may be playing a part in the adjudication of such
questions. From some preliminary work it does seem that the two opposed
models will prove clarifying-and may themselves be clarified-as they are
applied to a number of other topics in the constitutional and other basic law
of local government, including voting rights and the distribution of voting
power; 207 standards and rights regarding the incorporation of new local-
government units; 208 rights regarding the distribution of the costs and benefits
201Compare Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1685, 1776 & passim (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy].
2sSee notes 108-09, supra & text accompanying.
205See notes 5, 6 supra & text accompanying.
21t See, e.g., Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); Hill
v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973);
Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).20OSee, e.g., State ex rel. Davis v. Town of Lake Placid, 109 Fla. 419, 147 So. 468 (1933); F.
MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 612-21 (1970).
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of governmental operations within a unit;209 rights regarding the distribution
of fiscal burdens and capabilities across political units; 210 and rights regarding
fiscally motivated barriers to resettlement across political units.211 But those
puddings are still baking.
An eventual appraisal might be that one of the two opposed models
dominates the other in the judical treatment of open local government law
questions taken as a whole, in the sense of explaining all or most of what the
other can explain and much else besides. Or it might be that neither concep-
tion dominates, that the situation just seems irresolute. In that event inquiry
perhaps might turn towards trying to classify instances in which one or the
other model does seem dominant: can their respective domains be staked out
by subject matter? by type or level of official agency whose acts are under
review? by jurisdiction or level or reviewing court?21 2 by still some other
dimensions? If so, what further inferences are possible regarding the role in
law of these competing political images, or their role in contemporary in-
tellectual life generally, 213 or their sociological or anthropological underpinn-
ings?
A further possibility, which should not be overlooked, is that these two
conceptions, which seem opposed and mutually contradictory at the level of
abstraction naturally evoked by the legal doctrines and decisions examined
have, may at a deeper level be aspects of a unified conception not now fully
comprehended. This essay has enearthed a few clues to the possbility of such
a deeper synthesis: the need for an antimonopoly qualifier on community self-
determination; 214 the perception that the shared or objective 'Values underly-
ing or flowing from community self-determination may include-quite cen-
trally or prominently-respect for individual autonomy and civil liberties;216
and the converse perception that normative economic conceptions of govern-
ment may be founded on notions of pre-political, objective rights. 21 6 Pushing
this speculation a bit further, it may be what one sees are not outcroppings of
some underlying synthesis, but rather signs of enduring, irresolvable con-
205See, e.g., Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Commrs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916); Assoicated Home
Builders v. City of Walnut Bay, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971); Teagen
v. Borough of Bergenfield, 19 N.J. Super. 212, 290 A.2d 753 (1972); Sperry Rand Corp. v.
Town of North Hempstead, 53 Misc. 2d 970, 280 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
215 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (973); McLen-
nan v. Aldredge, 223 Ga. 879, 159 S.E.2d 682 (1968).521 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975).
21t As to the last possibility, see note 52 supra.
2
'The work of Duncan Kennedy is addressing questions of this sort. See Kennedy, supra
note 204; D. Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought 1850-1940" (various draft
chapters of unpublished manuscript).
t214See note 197 supra & text accompanying. LEVINE, supra note 20, at 74-78.
215See note 112 supra & text accompanying. Compare Horkheimer, supra note 203, at 175:
. [o]nly a definition of the objective goals of society that includes the purpose of the self-
preservation of the subject, the respect for individual life, deserves to be called objective."
21"See note 111 supra.
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tradiction.217 There may be no end to an iterative alternation between objec-
tivist and subjectivist foundations for political morality-each objectivist
premise seeming to rest on a still deeper subjectivist one, and vice-versa. 218
Those apparently objective, pre-political, natural rights, for example, may
just be hypostatizations of estimates about what configuration of fundamental
legal entitlements will best conduce to individual self-maximization, given
what seem to be enduring, if contingent, traits of human nature. 2 9 And yet
those estimates may, in their inspirations and available verbal justifications,
border on objectivist ethics or categorical imperatives.
VI. ECONOMICS: THE KEY TO LAW?
In introducing this study, I said that its aim was to see whether adjudica-
tion in "open" areas of public law can be characterized, as common-law ad-
judication has been characterized, as reflecting a fairly consistent judicial
striving to make the law correspond with an economic conception of what it
ought to be. In slightly different terms, the question has been whether there
seems to be an "implicit economic logic" in public law adjudication, parallel-
ing that which has been discovered in private law adjudication. 220 Looking
only at the very limited evidence presented here, the answer to that question
would seem to be in serious doubt.
Now suppose it turns out that further work confirms the suggestion of this
study, that insofar as one can say there is an economic influence at work in
public law adjudication, one must say, as well, that another and at least
equally powerful contradictory influence is also at work there. What bearing,
if any, would such a confirmed finding have on the validity of the descriptive
or explanatory economic theory of the common law?
At least three possible objections can be anticipated to a suggestion that
this descriptive hypothesis about public law has any bearing on the truth of
the positive economic theory of the common law: One objection would insist
on the difference between normative and positive theories; a second would in-
sist on a crucial distinction, in the positive economic theory of law, between
judicial and other governmental behavior; and a third would insist on a
critical difference between the normative economic theories of private and
public law in regard to their respective degrees of plausibility or of direct and
intuitive appeal. Considering these objections briefly, it seems that the first
objection is partly, but only partly valid-restricting but not wholly refuting
217See Kennedy, supra note 204, at 1766-76.2t
"Compare HORKHEIMER. supra note 203, at 175: "The two concepts [of subjective and ob-
jective reason] are interlaced, in the sense that the consequence of each not only dissolves the
other but leads back to it."
2"1 For a striking example of such thinking, see ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 121
(suggesting subjectivist economic account of right not to be raped). Compare B. DEJOUVENEL, ON
POWER 204 (1962).
220See note 2, supra & text accompanying.
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the claim that this essay's hypothesis about public law adjudication would, if
true, contradict the positive economic theory of common-law adjudication;
and that the second objection is beside the point except as it contributes
towards the restrictive force of the first. The few comments that can be of-
fered here regarding the third objection will not suffice either to dispose of it
or confirm it.
The first objection might be phrased this way: It has been shown above
(granting arguendo that anything at all has been shown) that judicial resolu-
tions of open public law issues do not conform regularly and closely to a nor-
mative or prescriptive economic theory about how government ideally ought
to work. The author has, in effect, been taking the part of a normative
public-choice theorist engaged in criticizing judical doctrines and decisions.
By contrast, the economic theory of the common law is a positive or descrip-
tive, not a normative or prescriptive, theory. The theorists mean not to
criticize or condemn such common law doctrines or decisions as are not effi-
cient, but rather just to show that the great preponderance of these doctrines
and decisions are, as it happens, efficient. So their works and this one are
asking different questions and there is, therefore, no way the answers can
contradict each other.
In order to see why this argument is partly, but only partly, right, we
need to take a closer look at the literature on the explanatory or descriptive
economic theory of the common law. That body of literature seems to be
branching into two which can be labeled an "automatic" branch and an
"intentional" branch. The automatic branch of the literature21 notes with in-
terest how the micro data of the common law-its countless doctrines, rules,
decisions-can apparently all 22 2 be captured and rendered by a simple, par-
simonious principle (which happens to be a normative principle)-that of ef-
ficiency. But what the automatic theorists are ultimately interested in is ex-
ploding this illusion of normative intention behind the common law. They
seek to show how the common law would tend to become efficient by a
mindless (automatic) process in which no one ever intended to make it effi-
cient-in which no one had any intentions at all regarding the social at-
tributes22 S of law or anything else-in which no motivations are supposed ex-
cept those of individuals in realizing their own, private ends. 224 For the mo-
221See Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.65 (1977).52
"All" is hyperbolic. Some anomalies remain to be explained. POSNER I, supra note 1, at
765. 2 3Efficiency is, of course, a "social" attribute of social practices or institutions--i.e., the at-
tribute of conducing to the satisfaction of private, individual preferences. See POSNER II, supra
note 62, at 350.
224The argument, briefly, is that rationally self-interested private agents will tend to
relitigate inefficient rules and doctrines more frequently than efficient ones; so that if judges are
assumed to be indifferent or oblivious to efficiency (and their decisions, then, are random with
respect to efficiency), there will be a tendency over time for inefficient rules and doctrines to be
weeded out and efficient ones to be stabilized.
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ment, at least it must be conceded that nothing presented in this study affects
the validity of the automatic branch of the positive economic theory of the
common law.225 Indeed, it could well be that an effect of the study will be to
strengthen the position of the automaticians in their dispute with the inten-
tionalists.
In the intentional branch of the theory, the potent explanation of the
common law's observed content takes the form of a thesis-itself, to be sure,
a purely descriptive one-about an intentional and normative fact: The com-
mon law is explained by reference to the judge's normative appreciation of,
and intentional striving for, the good of efficiency as a social goal. It is possi-
ble that intentional theorists are not ultimately interested in claiming that the
efficiency norm really exists within or motivates the judge, that they would
ultimately be content with the purely pragmatic claim that the observed
results of adjudication accord, on the whole, with those to be expected if such
a fantasy were true. Still, the theory's express form-which may be the source
of much of its charm--is that of ordering a huge collection of seemingly
disrelated phenomena by reference to a supposed judicial preference (veiled,
inarticultate, intuitive, semi-conscious) for efficiency. There can be no doubt,
at any rate, of a considered reliance on intentionality in some of the
literature: There are suggested explanations of why judges should be expected
to try to make their doctrines and decisions efficient;226 and there is discus-
sion seemingly aimed at defending the intentional version of the theory
against total demolition by automaticism.2 27
It may now be apparent that I think my evidence tells against the inten-
tional version of the descriptive economic theory of the common law. The
challenge posed by that evidence looks simple and straight enough: If the
judges are predominantly guided by an economic norm when engaged in for-
mulating and applying common law doctrine, why less so when formulating
and applying open public law doctrine? If, on the other hand, judges respond
ambivalently at best to economic norms on the public law side, why not
likewise on the common law side?
It must be made clear that economic analysts who claim that in common-
law, private-law, adjudication judges intentionally converge on efficient solu-
tions do not advance, nor are they logically constrained to advance, any
similar claims about legislators (including constitutional framers) engaged in
devising statutes or constitutions. Indeed, it is characteristic of economic in-
221The reason is that the automatic branch depends on an argument that rationally self-
interested private agents must, in deciding whether to litigate in an effort to modify some ex-
isting rule or doctrine, use calculations which will lead to more frequent relitigation of inefficient
than of efficient legal material. But in regard to public-law doctrines and rules, the relevant
agents include public officials and collective entities; and as to them, the argument from rational
self-interest to more frequent relitigation of inefficient material may not hold. (I have not yet
tried to work out an answer to the question whether it holds or not.)
22'See notes 229-30 infra & text accompanying.
227SeeEcONOMIC ANALYSIS, Supra note 2, at 440.
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terpretations of political life to make an antithetical claim about legislative
behavior-that legislative action is, as it supposedly must be, sold to par-
ticular interests rather than intentionally dedicated to any such "neutral"
criterion as efficiency. 228 This same literature suggests at least the beginnings
of a theoretical explanation for such a perceived difference between legislative
and judicial behaviors, based partly on the institutionalized insulation of
judges from the usual incentives of the marketplace (by life tenure, protection
against reduction of emolument, etc.) and the consequent replacement of
those by other incentives like peer approval or protecting judicial jurisdiction
against legislative curtailment. 22 Approval and jurisdiction, the theory sug-
gests, will seem to the judges to be subject to maximization by carrying out
the legislative intent where one is reasonably ascertainable and minimizing
waste (isn't everyone against waste?)230 where one is not. This extended
economic theory of official behavior of course cannot be impeached by show-
ing that particular statutes or constitutional provisions are inefficient as they
come from the hand of the legislator or framer. The question is whether it
can be impeached by showing that judges follow some star other than effi-
ciency when dealing with open constitutional or general public-law material
for which an ascertainable, historical intention does not exist and a plausible,
efficiency-oriented interpretation does exist. Well, why not? "Because," a
highly individualistic economist might say, "you can't prove anything in-
teresting with evidence so utterly unsurprising and predictable. Surely it is ut-
terly unsurprising that judges adjudicating public law questions do not treat
them as problems in economics, given the extreme difficulty (not to say im-
possibility) of producing a credible economic justification for the modern
state. Given that governmental authority has grown to a size and sweep which
seem on their face a contradiction of strictly economic normative premises,
given that individualistic economics cannot credibly justify the historical reali-
ty of our actual practice of government, how could one expect individualistic
economic norms to account for the interstitial general law through which
judges have policed the distribution of power within the governmental sphere
or its exercise by particular organs?"
Conceding that those would be forceful questions, are they any less telling
if directed against the claim that judges have historically done- and continue
to do-a semi-conscious economic number on the common law? The point is
that the very set of constitutional practices within which judicial authority
228See G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE ch. 8 (1975); ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note
2, at 405-07.
2t See EcONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 401, 404-405, 409-10, 415-17; Landes & Posner,
The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875 (1975). See
POSNER II supra note 62, at 351. But see Hirsch, Book Review, 22 U.C.L.A. REv. 980, 986-87
(1975).
213 See EcONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2, at 181; id. at 22 (suggesting that people speaking
of "injustice" usually mean "waste").
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arises-authority to adjudicate both public and private disputes-is one
which seems (at least to strongly individualistic economists) 23 1 to belie the no-
tion that efficiency is a salient and esteemed social value in the minds of the
politically influential citizenry. That seems to cut the ground from under the
suggestion that judges intentionally aiming to please either themselves, or the
legislature, or the peoople at large, would most likely fall back on efficiency
as a solvent for open doctrinal questions. Or, if the suggestion survives, it
must do so with a more precise (and interesting) meaning than we earlier
noticed in it: It seems that the judges' reference group, the folks whom the
judges aim to please, must consist of some sort of elite who are capable of ap-
preciating the goodness of efficiency even while the masses (or other elites)
whose actions actually shape the country's political destiny apparently do not.
No doubt there are sociological theories available to fill out that model rather
nicely. Still, one is less sanguine about the availability of sociological theories
which will explain why the reference group is believed by the judges to de-
mand that only common-law, and not also open public-law, issues be resolved
in the way efficiency calls for; and one cannot help doubting whether this
elitist theory of judicial reference groups, whatever it turns out to be in
detail, is what the intentional theorists have actually been contemplating.
If not, and if they no not wish to embrace it now, there is always open
the possibility of denying that the welfare state constitution is anti-economic
in spirit or effect. It has, in fact, already been shown how the Constitution is
not logically inexplicable in terms of those same individualistic economic
premises which the intentional theory supposes to have inspired the develop-
ment of the common law.2 3 2 Contrary to first appearances and the conten-
tions of some (not all) economists, the state's competence can, with at least a
semblance of plausibility, be understood as a "means reasonably (not
perfectly) designed to promote" the several self-interests of individual
citizens. 23 3 Earlier, a sophisticated argument (embracing two somewhat
related sub-arguments) was reviewed which reconciles the individualistic
assumptions of positive economics with familiar political constitutions in a
way such that efficiency-oriented common-law judging can be fitted into a
coherent justification of contemporary political ideology and practice. 23 4
Reconciliation by this route, however, comes only at a price: The intentional
economic theory of private law would then imply (that is, positivistically
predict) judicial adherence to the normative economic (public choice) model
of the Constitution. Insofar as this essay's discussion of the public purpose
231See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2, chs. 11-13, 16, 19; POSNER II, supra note 62,
at 336-40.
2"2See notes 31-48 supra & text accompanying.
21 3The quoted phrase was used by Professor Posner in his first edition of ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW to explain the economists' methodological assumption of rationally self-interested
behavior. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 5 (1st ed. 1973). It does not appear in the
second edition. I do not know why not.
235 See notes 33-48 supra & text accompanying.
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and delegation doctrines succeeds in falsifying this prediction from the inten-
tional economic theory, it would also, to a like extent, falsify that theory.
If that price seems too high, the intentional economic theory can still try
to maintain itself while rejecting both elitist sociology and the plausibility of
normative public choice theory. Its claim then would be that judges on the
private-law side try to make the law efficient-or, in other words, waste-
minimizing-because they sense that minimizing waste is something everyone
will intuitively like and applaud (or, at least, that assiduous and consistent
waste minimization will produce long-run results that everyone will like); but
that nothing analogous happens on the public-law side precisely because the
normative (public-choice) economic theory of government is (as shaped to fit
actual institutions) so weak and implausible (not to say fantastic) that judges
have no sense that acting in accordance with it will win them any approval.
The problem with that explanation would lie not so much in its rejecting, as
fantastic, the normative economic theory of the Constitution (if and as ap-
plied to justify actual constitutional practices) as in its ready acceptance of
the plausibility of thinking that formulating and applying the common law by
the canon of efficiency will in fact work out (or will be popularly seen to work
out) in a way that is advantageous for (almost) everyone in the long run. A
full treatment of the problem requires a careful development and criticism of
the (likely) precise meaning of "efficiency" as used in the positive economic
theory of the common law, and that is a task for another essay.
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